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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Thinking About War and Peace
There is no public issue on which clear thinking is
more in need or less in supply than that of war and
peace.
That thought came to mind as we read a highly enthusiastic survey of the European peace movement by
Marjorie Hope and James Young in the November 4
issue of The Christian Century. We were particularly
intrigued- and depressed- by the following two
paragraphs:
... Europeans , unlike Americans, have experienced the horror
of war on their soil. Their cities have been bombed , their homes
destroyed , their loved ones killed . They know both in their minds
and in their bones , the absurdity of violence. Two world wars 'to
end all wars' have devastated their countries-and instead of peace ,
they see the threat of annihilation.
Europeans know the futility of reliance on force . At the same
time they hear an American administration no longer emphasizing
'deterrence' but tacitly admitting to plans for a 'pre-emptive' first
strike. They witness Reagan's reluctance to discuss arms reductions
with the Soviets. They hear Reagan speak of the need for Americans
to become 'Number One' again. Are their fears of U .S. power naive?

A number of items here deserve comment.
To begin with, we can't imagine where Ms. Hope and
Mr. Young picked up the idea that the Reagan Administration is "tacitly admitting to plans for a 'pre-emptive'
first strike." The administration's comments on nuclear
matters have sometimes lacked discretion, including
the President's unfortunate public musings on the possibilities of limited nuclear warfare (which were made
after the Christian Century article appeared), but we
have never seen any hint of plans for an American first
strike. Such plans, if they existed, would be evidence
of evil madness in the White House. If Mr. Reagan is
indeed planning a pre-emptive first strike, he ought to
be impeached. But in the absence of hard evidence of
such plans, those who make the accusation can only be
seen as dangerously irresponsible.
The authors go on to tell us of the superior wisdom of
the Europeans, who, having had two world wars "to end
all wars" fought on their soil, understand "the absurdity
of violence" and "the futility of reliance on force." At
one level, one instinctively agrees: war is a great evil,
and many-perhaps most-wars leave problems in their
wake at least as great as those that precipitated the conflict in the first place. Yet the leap from an instinctive
antiwar impulse to the supposition that we could somehow do away with war if only we willed it deeply enough
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is a treacherous one. It runs athwart all of history and
all our knowledge of the relations that have obtained
between nations and peoples.
World War I, it is true, could have and should have
been avoided, and when Woodrow Wilson called it a
war to end war he compounded that conflict's illusions
and errors. But World War II was quite a different
matter. During the interwar years, millions of Europeans-and Americans-joined in the kind of peace
and disarmament movement Hope and Young find so
admirable. Arms create wars, the peace marchers said,
and they fought rearmament and pledged never to fight
again. Unfortunately, they failed to win Adolf Hitler
to their view of things, and the peace movement came
close to forcing the western democracies to hand over
Europe (for a starter) to the Third Reich. World War II
could have been avoided, but the price would have
been domination of the world by dictatorial powers.
The war was not fought, pace Hope and Young, to end
all wars but to prevent the further expansion of Hitler's Germany.
Detente is not necessarily appeasement, but it can be,
and emotional appeals to "the futility of reliance on
force" only make more difficult the rigorous political
and strategic analysis required to help us maintain the
proper distinctions. Do arms bring war? Sometimes
they do. But sometimes also they prevent wars.
War is absurd, and war between nuclear powers
would be doubly so. But that potential absurdity, like
much else of life's absurdity, has to be lived with, not
wished away or treated as if it did not exist. When John
Kennedy confronted the Soviet Union in 1962 over the
introduction of nuclear missiles into Cuba, he put his
country-and all the world-into the absurd situation
of drawing to the edge of war, quite possibly nuclear
war. But he understood that his constitutional responsibility for the security of the nation required that absurdity. It was his best judgment that preservation of a
decent peace necessitated moving to the brink of war.
That was a terrible-and absurd-decision to have to
make, but it had to be made then and it may someday
have to be made again.
None of this should be taken as a blanket endorsement of the Reagan Administration's defense policies
or diplomacy. We support a strong defense and a principled anti-Communist strategy, but bluster is dangerous (and counterproductive) and we would prefer to
see foreign policy conducted with the sophisticated
3
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realism that a Henry Kissinger brought to it rather
than with the superheated and simplistic sloganeering
that occasionally emanates from the President and his
national security advisers. We don't think that Mr.
Reagan is a Strangelovian madman, but we do wish
that he would keep his rhetoric under closer control
than he sometimes does.
But if the illusions of bluster are dangerous, so also
are those of people who dream that all swords can be
beat into ploughshares. Peace is a great good, but it is
not the only good, and its preservation on honorable
terms requires deeper understanding of both ethical
choice and international relations than the peace move- ·
ment shows evidence of possessing.
Cl

The Revival of the Political Center
Whatever its other virtues, the political center has
never been noted as the place to look for intriguing
perspectives or creative departures in political thought.
People turned to the center for stability, security, and
freedom from ideological enthusiasm. They did not go
to it in search of ideas or emotional rejuvenation. The
center was the place of sober and sensible respectability
to which one repaired after the flings and extravagances
of political youth.
But among the many unusual developments in recent
American politics has been a series of intellectual
eruptions that have occurred not at the outer edges of
the political spectrum, where such disturbances normally arise, but rather somewhere in the political center. For the first time in anyone's memory, the center
has become the place to search for whatever is new
under the political sun. The center is now the cutting
edge. (The imagery doesn't work, but the idea holds
nonetheless.)
First there was the neoconservatism of the 1970s.
Reacting against the perceived excesses of the New Left
and the New Politics, the neoconservatives launched
the most successful reappraisal of America's reigning
liberal assumptions in forty years. Without rejecting
the welfare state or making a fetish of the free market,
neoconservatives began to question the redistributive
and regulatory impulses that had come to dominate
liberal policy-making. They favored the preservation
of equal opportunity over the guarantee of equal results. They flatly rejected the assumptions behind
racial or sexual quotas, busing, lowering of educational
standards, prisoners' rights, no-growth economics, and
radical versions of gay rights or women's lib. They
thought the counterculture was intellectually and
morally flaccid and were not afraid to say so. They
defended meritocracy and the cultivation of excellence. They actively sympathized with traditional
middle-class values relating to work, family, and
religion.
In foreign policy, neoconservatives were unapolo4

getically anti-Communist. They hoped to further
human rights everywhere, but were willing to live,
however unhappily, with the authoritarian right in
those situations where it seemed the only immediate
alternative to the totalitarian left. N eoconservatives
thought America had been overwhelmingly a force for
good in the postwar world (though many conceded
that the country had gotten itself overextenqed) and
they wanted to see the nation's influence preserved
and defended. They rejected the notion that the war
in Vietnam should be seen as a demonstration of America's moral decay, and they paid little attention to
Third World rhetoric concerning "neo-imperialism."
Because they felt comfortable with broad national
purposes, they could defend without difficulty a foreign policy rooted in the concept of the national interest.
None of this, of course, went unchallenged. Liberals
and radicals identified neoconservatism with a failure
of political and moral will (many neoconservatives
had earlier thought of themselves as men and women of
the left) while traditional conservatives, although more
sympathetic, harbored suspicions that the neos were
closet liberals who had not yet, or at least not sufficiently, broken with their old faiths.
But the point remains that the neoconservatives, as
even many of their critics on the left conceded, had
gained the intellectual initiative. Traditional liberals
half-admitted that the old liberalism no longer worked
very well, but rather than rethink their assumptions,
they persisted in the old ones in the apparent hope
that redoubled effort might triumph over-or at least
obscure-the exhaustion of policy. (As someone noted,
their rallying cry seemed to be, "We have failed; let
us continue.") Radicals, meanwhile, continued in their
improbable search for a non-authoritarian Marxism,
but the dream of a democratic socialism that would be
genuinely both democratic and socialist seemed more
illusory than ever.
But neoconservatism flourished for reasons beyond
its opponents' flounderings. The new conservatives
almost immediately achieved the intellectual respectability that had for so long been denied to American
right-wing thinkers. Critics of neoconservatism might
find its ideas wrong-headed or pernicious, but they
could hardly argue that writers like Irving Kristo!,
Midge Deeter, Peter Berger, Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Nathan Glazer, Michael Novak, Seymour Martin Lipset, or Norman Podhortz were unintelligent or uninformed. Neither could such prominent intellectuals
be dismissed as lunatic-fringe crackpots operating
beyond the reach of serious notice. The neoconservatives did not transform American political thought,
but they did bring within the range of mainstream
attention a set of perspectives that had previously
existed only at the periphery of political consciousness. And for the first time in modern American history,
it actually became intellectually fashionable-or at
least tolerable-to deal with political ideas from within
The Cresset
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a framework skeptical of the received assumptions of
liberal/left ideology.
Developments in the world of political ideas were
matched, indeed exceeded, by events in electoral politics. The national swing to the right, begun in the late
1960s and delayed but not derailed by Watergate, culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan and the
attainment of a Republican majority in the Senate in
1980. Neoconservatism had in some sense been part of
this general conservative surge, but it had not caused
it and was not the major dynamic behind its political
accomplishments. The conservatism that seized Washington in November, 1980, was in general more fundamentalist in its assumptions and programs, more absolutist in its break with liberal ideas, than neoconservatism had ever been.
As the political spectrum drifted (or lurched) to the
right, and as the Republican party gained the ascendancy, neoconservatives had to make choices. Most
neoconservatives had traditionally been Democratic
in their voting habits and had hoped to operate politically within their old party. But with a few exceptions, most prominent Democrats (though not, it seems,
most Democratic voters) initially turned on the neoconservatives as traitors to the liberal cause. Meanwhile the Republicans, hardly knowing at first what to
make of it when prominent intellectuals said things
they could applaud and identify with, nonetheless
welcomed the neoconservatives with genuine, if sometimes bemused and wary, enthusiasm.
Some neoconservatives responded by associating
themselves fully with the Reagan program (though
Kristol was one of the few to openly declare himself a
Republican). Others, like Jeane Kirkpatrick and a
number of writers associated with Commentary magazine, became part of the new Administration's foreign
policy apparatus (or lent it their support) without
necessarily endorsing Reagan's domestic policies. Thus
they could satisfy their anti-Communist instincts without entirely giving up their social-democratic credentials. Overall, it would seem that most neoconservatives have been at least tolerant of the Reagan presidency and a great many have been much more than that.
But there are exceptions. Some neoconservatives
have kept their distance from the Reagan Administration and a few have actively opposed it. In so doing,
and yet in continuing at the same time to distinguish
themselves from the orthodox Kennedy-Mondale liberals, these political centrists have begun to stake out
a new political position and have even been christened
with a fresh political label: neoliberal. While continuing to share many things with the neoconservatives,
the neoliberals have opened distinctive and intriguing
po sibilities in the political center.
Pat Moynihan is a prime example. A founding father
of neoconservatism, Moynihan has emerged as a coni tent and effective critic of the Reagan Admini tration and the fundamentalist con ervati m that in hi
December, 1981

view dominates its policies. He wants the federal government brought under control but does not want it dismantled. (Reagan may not literally want to dismantle
government, but he often sounds that way.) Moynihan
wants selective tax cuts and would like to limit federal
spending, but he thinks supply-side economics is an
illusion. He knows that many welfare and job-creation
programs have not worked, but he continues to believe
that government has an active role to play in fighting
poverty and stimulating the economy. (He favors
direct aid to the poor rather than programs that require
extensive bureaucracies and elaborate planning mechanisms.) His foreign policy and defense differences
with the White House are less distinct, but he does
criticize the Administration for an over-dependence
on exotic weaponry and a too-ready willingness to disregard human rights violations by right-wing regimes.
Moynihan, of course, is a special case. As a Democratic Senator from New York, he has partisan reasons
for opposing a Republican Administration, and he also
has a generally liberal constituency to keep satisfied.
Yet his attitudes need not be dismissed as merely opportunistic or situational. He was, after all, even during
his years with the Nixon Administration, no enemy of
positive government; indeed, he focused his major
energies in those years on an almost-successful campaign
to enact legislation establishing a guaranteed annual
income. On no major issue can Moynihan be shown to
have changed his mind over the past few years. He has
stood still, but as the spectrum has moved to the right,
what was neoconservative now appears neoliberal.
Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, who last month
won re-election by an overwhelming majority, is
another politician to whom the neoliberal label has
recently been attached. Like Moynihan, Koch has frequently attacked the New Politics/elitist wing of the
Democratic party, which has, in his view, gotten so
out of touch with the American people as to threaten
to reduce the Democrats, who for years ruled comfortably over American politics, to the status of a minority rump. The elitist liberals have managed, he
says, to make the Democrats look like a party controlled by an ever more exotic array of special-interest
groups, all demanding an endless list of govemmentsponsored-and-paid-for "rights," and all expressing
resentful disaffection from traditional national values.
In the process, he goes on, the party has appeared
to disregard the concerns of the Middle-American majority. Koch and Moynihan alike want the Democratsand liberals in general-to pay more attention to ethnic
working-cla s and lower-middle-cla inter t . That
does not mean, they sugge t, for aking onomic liberali m, though it would r quire more careful attention
to the co ts of government program and a kepti i m
toward ocial engineering. It would m an a well a
mea ure of ocial con ervati m ( et tou h on crime,
upport traditional moral value , dr p quotas and
bu ing, play down gay right and om n' lib) and
5

support for a revival of American confidence, patriotism, and assertiveness in world affairs.
A number of observers have expres ed doubt as to
whether the Koch-Moynihan phenomenon has any
broader significance or whether, indeed, the separation of neoliberal from neoconservative is a distinction that expresses any real difference. Yet one need
not be naive concerning politicians' intentions or the
meaning of political labels to argue that more is going
on here than a case of political hype. The similarities
between neoconservatism and neoliberalism are undeniable, but so also are the differences.
The victory of Ronald Reagan has tended to draw ·
neoconservatives to the right, and some of them have
shown signs of disregarding those things that originally
separated them from the New Right (Richard Viguerie,
et al.) and from the orthodox conservatism represented
by William Buckley, Jr. and his friends at National
Review. N eoliberals like Moynihan and Koch acknowledge the limits of government but still look on it as a
positive force in national life, while many neoconservatives, in aligning themselves with the Reagan
Administration, seem to have absorbed from it its
fundamental mistrust of government. Moynihan describes himself as a (John) Kennedy Democrat, and his
voting record in the Senate is liberal enough that the
National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC) has targeted him for defeat in the 1982 elections. Moynihan and Kristo! are a lot farther apart
politically than they were a few years ago.
That neoliberalism is more than an oddity of New
York politics is indicated if one looks again to the realm
of political ideas. If journals like Commentary and
Public Interest were the intellectual vehicles of neoconservatism, the New Republic today shows signs of becoming the voice of neoliberalism. Through most of
the years since its founding in 1914, the New Republic
has served as the intellectual flagship of mainstream
American liberalism. It is still highly influential, and
in recent years it has established an editorial position
that, while still recognizably on the left, is not simply
reflexively liberal and extends well beyond automatic
invocation of liberal pieties.
As would be expected, the New Republic has been
highly critical of the Reagan Administration's policies.
But its criticisms have been moderate in tone, respectful of facts and of the ambiguity of politics and policymaking, and normally free of cheap moralism or sentimental populism. (It has run a number of items contemptuous of the religious left's tendency to issue grand
moral pronouncements that blithely ignore economic
or political complexity.) The New Republic argues
that the Administration's policies are too solicitous of
the wealthy and insufficiently directed to the problems
of the poor. At the same time, it recognizes that effective welfare programs can only be constructed on
the foundation of a healthy economy, and that creation
of such an economy requires attention to problems of
6

runaway inflation, insufficient capital formation, and
lagging productivity. Unlike the more sentimental
liberals, the editors of the New Republic understand
that in the absence of non-inflationary economic growth,
appeals to "compassion" and "concern" take on an air
of indulgent unreality. America can only redistribute
what it has first produced.
In foreign policy, the New Republic again takes a
position critical of the Administration and yet skeptical of the kind of liberal foreign policy attitudes exemplified by, say, William Fulbright or George
McGovern. It favors detente and strenuous efforts
toward disarmament, but it does not suppose that those
ends will be achieved simply by good will or by unilateral gestures of accommodation. The editors of the
New Republic have a special concern for the security
of Israel, and like a number of other Jewish intellectuals, they have been nudged to the right by the recognition that a nation's security depends on a strong
defense and an unillusioned realism concerning the
uses of power. Yet they at the same time prefer an antiCommunist policy (and they are firmly anti-Communist) more ideologically sophisticated and more
cognizant of the dangers of nuclear escalation than the
Reagan Administration has so far put together.
What all this suggests is the emergence of a political
program that cannot reasonably be termed conservative and yet that refuses to genuflect before all the
customary liberal icons. It is markedly distinct from
the policies and instincts of Reagan Republicanism at
the same time that it rejects the radical-chic version
of liberalism that led the Democrats to disaster in
1972 and that continues to alienate large sectors of the
electorate from their traditional liberal voting patterns. It is the kind of liberalism what, when first proposed by Pat Moynihan and others like him, seemed to
liberal stalwarts to be a kind of treason, but which
now looks to many of them like the most promising,
perhaps the only, road that they might take back to
political favor.
There is no way of knowing how influential neoliberalism will become in the politics of the eighties.
We strongly suspect, given the general rightward shift
of the spectrum, that it will have a sizable impact.
In the meantime, it is already serving a most useful
political purpose: it is making a significant number of
politicians and political intellectuals rethink their
assumptions.
More generally, it is contributing to that revival
of the political center that neoconservatism began and
that we think is the most promising political development of the past decade. The center, whether in its
neoconservative or neoliberal versions, is no longer
the gathering place of the bland and burnt-out· it is
rather the home of ome of the most original and lively
political thinkers of our time. And a politic of that
kind of center is the best kind of politics merica could
conceivably hope for.
Cl
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Simul
A Lutheran Reclamation Project in the Humanities

Martin E. Marty
Each morning the ship's captain sneaked into his
cabin after breakfast for a mysterious ritual. He would
emerge competent and confident for the daily task of
running the ship. Curious crew members once were able
to peak past a curtain in the porthole, saw him remove a
slip of paper, read it, fold it, and lock it again. What
message did it convey?
Eventually the captain died. The crew's first act was to
break into the cabin safe to read the bit of paper that had
guided their leader so surely for so many years. It said,
simply, "The right-hand side is the starboard side."
The piece of paper in my little cabin safe, one that is
supposed to help me guide you through part of an inquiry into the humanities, bears a simple word "Simul."
That is not much of a message, since it is nothing but the
Latin word for "at the same time." But for those of us
who like to go back to basics, who cannot always remember "port" from "starboard," it can serve as a code or a
clue for a more complicated task.

I
I shall argue that a Lutheran-based cultural view will
see the human being or the human record simul, always
"at the same time" as being both the human of humanities humanism and the human that is the subject of
divine reclamation. The former is not bad and the latter
good; there is room for the "good" humanist or humanistic venture and more than enough room for the "bad"
human in the situation of being saved. But the distinction between the two ways of being and looking at the

Martin E. Marty is the Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Modern Christianity at the
niversity of Chicago, associate editor of The Christian
Century, and author of many books. He was on the Commission on the Humanities and is a member of the Board of the
ational Humanities Center. He has been an occasi'onal
~re et contributor si"nce publishing anonymous poetry in i"t
in
ovember, 1945. This essay was delivered at the annual
meeting of the Association of Lutheran College Faculties at
alparaiso University on October 2, 1981.
December, 1981

human can be of value in humanistic inquiry today.
The original formula using simul has to do with the
second human situation, the one having to do with
"being saved." In the Lutheran formula, the human is
at one and the same time a righteous person and a sinner, simul justus et peccator. The believer as a human is
both, entirely. What separates them is the vantage God
uses when looking at the human. "In myself outside of
Christ, I am a sinner; in Christ outside of myself, I am
not a sinner." ( WA 38, 205). So much for "being saved."
Our interest is in understanding the concept of simul in
contrast to some beguiling alternatives and then in
working out some analogies from the "being saved" to
the "being human" realm.

Not a Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
Simul, at the same time, is not the same as aut/aut,
"either/or." The distinction is not between humans but
within each one, each believer. Nor is it modo/modo, now
and then, as in the case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. In
most respects this view of the human is not even partim/
partim, "partly/partly." What matters is the aspect under
which God views the human and the situation in which
the human is found.
People trained to look at humans in the light of simul
in the dimension of "being saved" should be able to
acquire it as a mentality, a habitus, a reflex, or a skill.
This does not mean that a view of humanism born of
this vantage is the only plausible one. There is an intrinsic case to be made for humanism, entirely apart from
its relation to religion, Christianity, or Lutheranism.
One hopes that teachers in the humanities at state universities are able to make or respond to such a case, and
that these teachers include informed Christian . Instrumental cases have their value: one tudie humaniti in
order to increase imagination or, po ibly, kill . As a
result, one may be better equipped to engage in bu ine s
or government. One might, third, reclaim humaniti
on broadly religious grounds, arguing that th acral
climen ion has an intrinsic and instrumental valiclity.
And of cour e, there are many Christian rationale .
Among the e are Jacque Maritain' Catholic and atural Law or Reason project of "Integral Humani m,' th
7

Lutheran humanism has been undervalued: The pluralism of American culture has been more familiar
with secular, Calvinist-Puritan,Jewish, or Catholic humanisms than with any Lutheran models.

Christian Humanisms of the Erasmian tradition, or
many kinds of Calvinistic humanisms that see "Christ
transforming culture," to use H. Richard Niebuhr'sformula.
The purpose here is not to say which of these four
genera or their many species is better or worse than the
other, or than Lutheranism. At the moment we are interested in distinctives, not in grading systems. Not all nonLutheran humanists or, for that matter, all Lutheran ·
ones, will bring natural curiosity to this search for distinctives. Different strokes for different folks, different
messages in cabin safes for different captains. Yet there
are some good reasons to discuss here and now a Lutheran base and case for reclaiming humanism.

The Idea of Lutheran Anti-Humanism
An Association of Lutheran College Faculties, at
least once a year in solemn assembly, naturally explores
its roots and focus, so my remarks at least are credible
as a bow to the concept of "and now, a word from our
sponsor." Second, the simul concept is on this Lutheran
humanist's figurative scrap of paper, and it is this one
whom you invited to begin this reflection. Third, if
there is a Lutheran contribution, it has certainly been
undervalued in American culture, with its pluralism
that is more familiar with secular, Calvinist-Puritan,
Jewish, or Catholic humanisms than with any Lutheran
models. One more reason for taking up the subject: if
one gets the Lutheran case a little bit wrong, it will be
anti-humanistic, as anti-humanistic as many practicing
Lutherans regard their faith to be, or as many antiLutherans-like Jacques Maritain-interpreted it to be.
Turning that around, if one can make the humanistic
case on Lutheran grounds, many other kinds of Christian humanisms are "home free." And, if my interpretation is correct, a Lutheran understanding based on the
concept of simul-vision, will be a legitimation that will
yield to no other in its high claims for humanism and
humanities.
Luth~ran anti-humanism is often diagnosed by other
Christian humanists. I have already alluded to Jacques
Maritain, a great thinker who got Luther ludicrously
wrong. In Three Reformers Maritain took one side of
Luther's simul in respect to the human as a rational
being and saw Luther as a simple irrationalist, antiintellectualist, and individualist romantic. "Unable to
conquer himself, he transforms his necessities into theological truths, and his own actual case into a universal
law."
Far more intelligent and deserving is the understandable uneasiness expressed by Robert Cushman, who
made one of the more impressive recent statements on
8

the problems of Christian Humanism at St. Olaf College
in 1978 (published in Faith Seeking Understanding: Essays
Theological and Cultural). For him, true humanism must
be grounded in a common fund of reason. Luther's
postulate of "salvation by grace through faith" rests, he
says, on the Pauline gospel. "But its republication was
attended by a doctrine of God and a consequent doctrine
of man, inherited, I believe, not from the New Testament but from the widely influential Occamistic philosophy." That philosophy "carried with it a breach of
any intelligible relations" such as those between Creator
and creation or between God and man, except in the
case of "special Providences" when God wanted to make
connections. Creation became ambiguous. Man was
"ophaned" and saw "the dissolution of the inherent structures of the created order of due natural process . . . . "
And without inherency of this sort, there cannot naturally or easily be a humanism. Cushman's urbane and
kindly critique, which sets up a problem for him as a
Christian humanist, a problem he passes on to others,
deserves careful analysis. I consider it to be part of the
"challenge" for reclaimers of humanism on Protestant
soil, to which the simul concept is an address.

II
So Lutheranism may make a contribution to reclaiming humanism; we have not yet detailed what kind of
humanism needs and merits reclaiming. It is as difficult
to propose a definition of humanism that will gain consent as it is to define religion to any two people's satisfaction. I feel no responsibility for all the nuances of the
term. Thus the case for humanism as "humaneness"
might be made on other grounds. It would be nice to
believe that the humanism of the humanities would always be humane or promote humaneness, but even its
most ardent advocates do not make such a claim. Thus
the Commission on the Humanities in 1980 argued that
"the humanities do not necessarily mean humaneness,
nor do they always inspire the individual with what
Cicero called 'incentives to noble action."'
At the other end of the spectrum, this is no defense of
a reclaimed religious humanism. Such a humanism
would take the metron anthropos of Protagoras, arguing
that "man is the measure of all things," and turn it into
a dogma that excludes transcendental measures. Even
so far it would remain a philosophy; religious humanism, I take it, surrounds this mundane proposition with
ceremonial reinforcements myths and symbols, metaphysical claims and a call for behavioral response. Let
the votaries of St. Protagoras Church take care of their
own case.
The humanism before us must be "humanities humanism.' Some clues for that chaste designation come
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from the fact that an association of college faculties
picked the topic. But by moving beyond "humanities"
to "humanism" and including "arts and sciences," there
is no impulse to turn the inquiry into a discussion of
humanities departments or corners of curricula. Instead, we move into a "zone," as I like to think of it, a
zone in which the formal humanities disciplines have a
custodial stake. Let the Commission on the Humanities,
if it cannot define, at least point to and describe that
zone:
The humanities mirror our own image and our image of the world.
Through the humanities we reflect on the fundamental question:
what does it mean to be human? The humanities offer clues but
never a complete answer. They reveal how people have tried to make
moral, spiritual, and intellectual sense of a world in which irrationality, despair, loneliness, and death are as conspicuous as birth,
friendship, hope, and reason. We learn how individuals or societies
define the moral life and try to attain it, attempt to reconcile freedom
and the responsibilities of citizenship, and express themselves artistically .... By awakening a sense of what it might be like to be someone else or to live in another time or culture, they tell us about ourselves, stretch our imagination, and enrich our experience. They increase our distinctively human potential.

That zone is chopped up into smaller zones. That they
exist is evident from college catalogues, departmental
structures, American Associations for the Advancement
of the Humanities, and a National Endowment of the
Humanities, which in Public Law 89-209 was sub-zoned
into "language, linguistics, literature, history, jurisprudence, philosophy, archaeology, comparative religion, ethics, the history, criticism, theory, and practice
of the arts" and "those aspects of the social sciences which
have humanistic content and employ humanistic method
along with the study and application of the humanities
to the human environment with particular attention to
the relevance of the humanities to the current condition
of national life." That encroaching definition of a zone
hardly stops short of many kinds of science, and there is
no reason for people in "sciences" to feel second-class
to those in "arts" when humanities humanism comes up
as a topic. Just as not all humanists are in the field of
academic humanities, so, as we shall find out, not all in
those fields are humanists either.
Humanities humanism was born, as Cushman reminds us, on the soil of Renaissance Christian Europe,
roughly in the time of Petrarch (1304-74), when it was
called urnanista. Born of an interest in revisiting classical
culture, it soon expanded throughout the universities
until it did become a subject for the fifteenth-century
equivalents of curriculum committees. Ernest Gellner
how what confusion followed: ·
\ hat is 'humanist culture'? Essentially , culture based on literacy .
11 human society and civilization presuppo es language as such :
but humanist or literate culture is not cerextensive with all human
ci ilization. It is distinguishable from illiterate 'tribal' culture on the

December 1981

one hand, and from the more-than-literate scientific culture on the
other. The term 'humanist' is of course unfortunate, and survives
from the days when a concern with mundane, 'human' literature was
primarily distinguished, not from either illiteracy or science, but
from theological, divine concerns. But for contemporary purposes,
it is the literacy, and not its mundane or extra-mundane orientation
which matters. 'Humanist' concerns now embrace the divine. (Both
speak the same language.)

This Petrarchian urnanista and curricular division
did not remain mundane; indeed, as Cushman shows,
even Petrarch's version was built to fly. He quotes John
A. Symond's The Revival of Learning to make the point.
The essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of
the dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations, and the further perception that classic literature alone
displayed human nature in the plenitude of intellectual and moral
freedom.

That "essence" or virus is what got humanism of most
sorts in trouble with Luther and other Reformers, all of
whom profited from the revival of "classic literature"
as such. That strain is what creates the tension within the
Lutheran simul view of arts, sciences, humanities, and
learning.

The Essence of the Humanities
We could play it safe and take more modest visions
of the essence of the humanities. A very recent one by
University of Washington English Professor Charles
Altieri (Act and Quality: A Theory of Literary Meaning and
Humanistic Understanding) would create fewer problems,
and one could easily build a charter for the humanities
in a Lutheran college on its terms:
The humanist is devoted to ideas of education because s/ he believes
that ( 1) certain forms of knowledge transform one's powers to act
and to understand others through their actioQs ; (2) education plays
the role of creating ' noble' models and leading someone to want to be
able to represent his value as a person in terms of those models ; ( 3)
both the models and the terms for discovering actions are richest
when one can recover, from pieties and historical positivities, the
energy that works of genius can give to the present; and ( 4) one can
recover and use these works of genius because they do not simply
make statements or reflect historical conditions-being neither philosophy nor history , they present concrete, nondiscursive qualities of
actions in representative situations , o that the human images they
embody remain significant as images for tho e in other cultures .

Let us take the harder ca e, the Petrarchan one that
tempts to the Protagoran, the "dignity of man" the i
that made the humanistic order eem intrin ically valuable, that endowed the creaturely order with too much
creativity, and that tempted Chri tian to forget th Fall
and move toward topia. ot all humani mi o alluring, but to make the challenge to the simul cone pt exciting, we hould rai th take a hi h a p ibl .
Cu hman i appropriately on th point again:
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Luther might share with Petrarch the judgment that the conscience
of man does indeed alert him to his calling under God. But the conscience was always , for Luther, a guilty one, notifying men not of the
sufficiency but of the bondage of their wills when devoid of justifying Grace. Moreover, justification by faith was not entire liberation.
Men remained at once [simuij justified, and yet sinners . Utopianism ,
therefore, was completely alien to Luther's viewpoint, and on at
least two grounds : first , the condition of man in present bondage to
Satan, and , second , the end of man as , not the kingdom of man
founded either upon the arts or the sciences, but the Kingdom of God
founded by faith alone in Jesus Christ. ... These two grounds , with
their corollaries, remove Luther, as also Calvin, from the provi"nce
of even the moderate humanism of Petrarch or Mirandola and make
them irreconcilable adversaries of modern secular humanisms of
whatever species.

Cushman begins to rewrite a charter for Christian
humanism by "resorting in good Lutheran fashion to
Scripture-to Genesis 1:26" and, in a way, bypassing the
Reformers. Such a Christian humanism "would not view
human culture, however splendid, as the end of man ....
It would indeed extol man's fulfillment of his endowment or given potential," but this fulfillment would be
a response to sovereign grace (Romans 1:5). Christian
humanism "is responsible existence under God dedicated to seekingffrst 'the Kingdom of God and his righteousness.'" I agree in the main with Cushman's approach,
but do not want to abandon the Reformers so easily.

Of Humanism and Religious Belief
Christian humanism versus mundane humanisms
pose themselves off against each other in popular and
high literature alike. A sample of each is in order.
Michael J. Farrell, a columnist in the Nati'onal Catholic
Reporter, recently took up the defense of humanism.
He, too, began with Petrarch and the innovative spirit
that "spread to include the arts and other secular pursuits." Then: "The more life here below fascinates, the
less God usually does. Nevertheless, virtually all Renaissance humanists were Christians and ardent in their
way .... " The drift from God may be a psychosocial
reality, documentable in the lives of Charles Darwin,
H. G. Wellss William Graham Sumner, and others who
saw their faith shrivel or saw the starry skies come to
look like faded wallpaper in a suburban train station as
they became preoccupied with nature and history. But
the example of Renaissance humanists, through Martin
Luther, down to contemporary Christian humanists
shows that just the opposite may be the case.
In a "high culture" passage, Frederick Olafson (The
Dialectic of Action: A Philosophical Interpretation of History
and the Humanities) is historically accurate but not substantively inclusive about the either/or situation:
The relationship between humanism and religious belief is one that
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has given difficulties for centuries and has caused a good deal of personal anguish to those humanists like St. Jerome and Petrarch who
have aspired to be sincere Christians. That there is some deep source
of conflict here seems undeniable; but it would just as certainly be
mistaken to define humanism as atheistic or even antireligious . There
have been forms of religious belief that are radically incompatible
with humanism because they proclaim the nothingness of man and
transfer to their gods every possible form of agency or achievement
with which man might otherwise be tempted to credit himself. ...
But there are also religions that teach that there is something, however limited , that human beings as individuals and as societies can
do and that thus concede a measure of significance and value to the
achievements of human culture and even allow a modicum of human pride, as well as of shame, stemming from the contemplation
of what has been done .. . . Nevertheless, it seems proper to speak of
a humanistic disposition on the part of a society only when it has
become possible to assert openly that these human powers are real
and that what can be achieved by means of them is significant and
valuable.

Olafson's preference for words like "however limited" or
"a measure of significance" shows that he belongs to the
partim/partim school. A religious approach to humanism
is a modest "part" of the whole religious outlook. The
simul view is quite different; it demands exposure.

III
Let me begin to show why "either/or," "now and
then," or "partly/partly" views never seemed to me to
do justice to a Lutheran Christian view of the humanistic dimension with a homely example. As a relatively
young child I had to make sense of Christmas hymns in
the Lutheran tradition. What of this great Christian
Keimann example from 1646?
Tell abroad God's goodness proudly
Who our race hath honored thus
That He deigns to dwell with us.

Admittedly, translator Catherine Winkworth had
heightened the delicious scandal of the incarnation by
her rather free translation of Freuet euch, ihr Christen
alle.
Freuet euch mit groszen Schalle,
dasz her uns so hoch geacht't,
sich mit uns befreund't gemacht.

Had I been born thirty years earlier and sung this in
the German, the nuance might have been strong about
friendship but the thunder of divine identification with
the race to which I belonged would have been lost. Still,
it was the translation that appeared in the The Lutheran
Hymnal, a book that survived censors far more censorious than the pecksniffs of Keimann's seventeenth-century world could have produced.
What about the question from another Lutheran
hymn, this one snatched from the lair of the pietists
themselves? Paul Gerhardt asked, in our Winkworth
The Cresset
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translation:
If our blessed Lord and Maker
Hated men, Would He then
Be of flesh partaker?
[Hatte vor der Menschen Orden
Unser Heil Einen Greu'l,
War er nicht Mensch worden.]

I should grow up to turn my back against study of the
race God chose to join, the one the Lord and Maker
chose not to hate? If those hymns belonged in the worship canon, even allowing for poetic license, then Lutheran anti-humanities impulses of the sort that often
showed up were out of place. But hymns are for on deck
occasions. The Luther-an case has to be made down near
the simul slip in the cabin, where we have to get port
and starboard correct for purposes of navigation. Back
to the source, Luther himself.

Simul in the Analogue of Nature
Not being a Luther scholar-or, rather, being a "master," not a "doctor," in his thought-and he not falling
into my "period" as an historian (we humanists have to
guard our specialties) I should issue many disclaimers.
My reading of Luther is not that of a primary-source
seeker but rather that of someone who takes his discovered texts as documents of humanistic culture, much
the way I read Petrarch or Erasmus. I depend upon,
defer to, and am ready to have my clutching knuckles
rapped, by the experts. But one must be bold when dealing with the Kunta Kintes of one's own Roots, and I shall
be, while paying respects to some scholars from whom I
borrowed or stole. Disclaimers past, we shall look at five
sub-zones at the edges of and then safely within the
humanities.
Science. Heinrich Bornkamm (Luther's World of
Thought) knows and shows the understanding of simul
employed by Luther when the Reformer dealt with the
person in the situation of being saved. And he also carries it over, without developing it, into corollaries and
analogues in other dimensions of human life. He well
knows what everyone learns in dealing with Luther that
the created order, nature, is fallen. The demonic pervades the structures of existence. Luther was almost an
animist when dealing, for instance, with the terrors of
thunder. But simul, at the same time, this terrifying,
fallen beguiling, demonic, misusable and misused
world of nature is there to quicken awe ome enthu ia m
on the part of one who seeks scZ:entia.
The same person who could talk about the pus-filled,
putrid dung-heaped world could write in the la t year
of hi life in a book of Pliny:
11 creation i the mo t
December, 1981

beautiful book or Bible; in it God has described and
portrayed Himself." Nature is a sign of God's hidden
wisdom and of the purposes that nature serves. A sixteenth-century Rachel Carson, he stimulates a sense of
wonder among the non-scientific clods:
[Most people] are so accustomed to [the works of God in nature] ;
they are as permeated with them as an old house is with smoke; they
use them and wallow around in them like a sow in an oats sack. Oh ,
they say, is it so marvelous that the sun shines? That fire heats?
That water contains fish? That hens lay eggs? That the earth yields
grain? That a cow bears calves? That a woman gives birth to children? Why , this happens every day! You dear dolt Hans , must it be
insignificant because it happens daily? ... If God created all other
women and children of bone, as He did Eve, and but one woman
were able to bear children, I maintain that the whole world, kings
and lords, would worship her as a divinity. But now that every woman is fruitful , it passes for nothing .. .. Is it not vexing to see the
accursed ingratitude and blindness of mankind?

Luther credited "the upright" with a passion for wonder and inquiry.
For whenever they behold a work of God , they imagine how conditions would be without it. Death ennobles life, darkness praises the
sun, hunger kisses the precious bread , sickness teaches the meaning
of health, etc. The word 'not' prompts them to praise the 'being'
( Wesen) , and this implies that they search, explore, and ponder the
works of the Lord , esteem them , and imagine what the world would
be like if these works had not been created.

That may not be the passion of the modern scientist who
pursues inquiry for its own sake, but it would charter a
good career in science. And on this score it is Luther
who scolds Erasmus for being the "dear dolt Hans."
We [in the Reformation] are now living in the dawn of the future
life; for we are beginning to regain a knowledge of the creation , a
knowledge we had forfeited by the fall of Adam .... Erasmus does
not concern himself with this ; it interests him little how the fetus is
made, formed, and developed in the womb. Thus he also fails to
prize the excellency of the state of marriage. [God's power] is evident
even in a peach stone. No matter how hard its shell , in due season it
is forced open by a very soft kernel inside it. All this is ignored by
Erasmus. He looks at the creatures as a cow stares at a new gate.

Rather than argue that Luther develops a full humanistic charter for scientific disciplines, I only want to
point to the extremism in his defen e of liberty to wonder about nature and the creation simul, at the same
time that he ponders the death and decay that pervade
them.
History. Hi tory is one of the central humanitie disciplines, and is di do ive in different way of the human
situation. Luther's Ur-text on endowing the world of
human event with meaning and in piring inquiry i
one that sZ:mul, at the ame time, rob creation of final
revelatory power in the matter of "being a ed." I ref r
to the 1 th and 19th the e of th Heidelberg Di putation of 151 . There he po e the theologia gloria ov r
again t the theologia crucis. The former promot
pecu11
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lation, based on creation, concerning the Creator, and
issues in claims that one is right with the Creator as the
result of such attempts to peer into the divine majesty.
The latter is content with the weak, the meek, the offense, the empirically-verifiable side of God in the traces
left in history, in the revelation of suffering.
That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks
upon the invisible things of God as if it were clearly perceptible in
those things which have actually happened . He deserves to be callecl
a theologian , however, who comprehends the visible and manifest
things of God seen through suffering and the cross.

One side of this is anti-humanistic: it seems to cut off
all understandings of human potential through philosophical speculation or study of creation. Simul, at the
same time, it provides a legitimation of human history
in which God is, to use Father Divine's colorful image,
"tangibilificated." The Heidelberg reference goes back
to Exodus 33 where Moses wants to see God's glory. God
says no one can see the glory and live, so he places Moses
in a cleft in the rock and holds his hand over it until the
glory has passed by. Moses then gets to see the posteriora
dei, God's buttocks or rear end, and that is enough. Now
I admit that a humanism that allows for the beatific vision of the glory would sound nobler than one that
forces contentment with "the hind parts of God" in the
tracks at Golgotha or in the suffering of a Christian in
war, because of disease, or whatever. Yet who is to say
that the second kind is removed from the humanism of
the humanities?
Luther's views are not a complete charter for the autonomy of secular history, but his view of two Regimente,
two orders, politia and religi'o, is certainly an amplification of the Heidelbergian view of history. In poli'tia,
which is under reason and law and not salvation of souls,
simul, at the same time one is seeking salvation, there is
a life to be lived which can be informed not so much by
the saving sacred scriptures as by the wisdom of the historians, jurists, and poets of the Greek and Roman
world. In the worldly sphere Luther speaks of the human as cooperator Dei, not the integral humanist's agent
of creation, but the Christian view of the human as instrument of Creator. In that sphere the cooperator Dei
is not always t~lking about "being saved," but is serving
a vocation as a magistrate, consul, doctor, teacher, student, family member, servant, or king, any of which
roles is a persona or laroa, a mask, not of the devil but of
God. At the same time, each person has a Christian persona and a secular one, and yet he or she is not therefore
schizoid but a liver-out of vocation. The secular dimension is also life lived coram Deo, under God.
Luther can sound anti-humanistic as he downgrades
world history proper in contrast to the history of the
people of God. "Therefore the histories of all the world
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have been taken at once as incomparably more worthless
than the most worthless story of this people." But then
he turns around and asks for humanistic care in the
writing of world history, in which God is also active. In
a preface to Galeazzo Capella's History in 1538, he
praises the office of historian and gives words that belong on the wall of humanities-historians in churchrelated settings today: "For because histories describe
nothing other than God's work- that is grace and wrath
-which one must so worthily believe as if they stood in
the Bible, they should certainly be written with the
greatest diligence, faithfulness, and truth." Such histories are disclosive of the human situation and deserve
care in reading and writing even though they are not
Gospel narratives which help "save."
Philosophy. Another central humanistic discipline is
philosophy, which classically always and contemporaneously sometimes addresses precisely the humanistic
issues that concern us here. The simul approach is urgent when dealing with philosophy, which centers in
wisdom and reason, given Luther's oft-quoted critique
of reason. I need not elaborate on this since my colleague Brian Gerrish has written at book length on this
precise theme (Grace and Reason: A Study £n the Theology
ofLuther). He reproduces the Luther texts that show him
to be anti-humanist in respect to philosophy. Reason is
"the Devil's Whore," a "beast," an "enemy of God," a
"source of mischief," "carnal," and "stupid." The greatest philosopher, Aristotle, was the "destroyer of pious
doctrine," a mere "Sophist and quibbler," an inventor
of fables, and an "ungodly public enemy of the truth."
There is more: Aristotle is lazy-ass, billy-goat, trickster,
rascal, liar and knave, blind pagan.

Luther on Aristotle and Cicero
Yet Luther does not dismiss philosophy in the humanities out of hand. He praises Cicero, who is not a lazyass, and half expects and more than hopes to see him in
heaven. He discriminates within the Aristotelian corpus, and admires Aristotle on ethics. In fact, barbarum
est, it is philistine not to know Aristotle's natural philosophy, which belongs to culture and has many sound
arguments. In loco justificationis, in the matter of being
saved, it is worthless, inimical to faith, and belongs to
contemplation and "work-righteousness." Simu~ at the
same time, apart from that realm of misuse, it has a
positive potential. After Gerrish's work there seem to
be few reasons to have to begin from scratch to re cue
Luther-on-philosophy in proper contexts. But o entrenched in the humanistic culture is the side that knoweth not simul that for a generation the task will ha e to
go on. Lutherans who do not know the case and who
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therefore oppose philosophy in culture only prolong
the agony and confusion.
Political science, government, law, jurisprudence. Luther has a charter for both the exercise and the humanistic study of all that relates to laws and government. Few Christian geniuses more than he have attacked the demonic power of the governed and the
governors, but simul, at the same time, he also goes almost to the other extreme in legitimating their relation.
It is hard to rule out curiosity about das irdische Reich,
the earthly kingdom, from his corpus of writings. His
concern for societatis humanae, even though that "civilization" is under the mark of the prince of the world
and the powers of death, is engrossing and lively. For
it has another side: society is also a realm of divine activity. The communia or institutions of life are ordained
by God, proper spheres for human activity and "civil
works," which call forth "natural reason" but which
issue in "spiritual" engagements.

Reason as Part of the Divine Scheme
In this context, reason is consistently a part of the
divine scheme. Luther personifies it as the "inventress
and mistress of all the arts, of medicine and law, of whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and glory men possess in
this life." And the Fall did not change this; in its sphere,
reason is God's greatest, inestimable, gift. Such reason
is to pervade the realms of government and laws.
Here again, Luther is not a "now and then," "either/
or" or "partly/partly" type. His simul approach is extremely humanistic and anti-humanistic at once. Technically, in loco justificationis, in the matter of justification,
law is Law of God, which always and only accuses and
terrifies. Extra locum justifi"cationis, outside that situation
or teaching, law, like reason, is an immeasurable gift.
Luther can pass out compliments to it as he did to music.
Next to the office of ministry, there is "on earth no more
precious gem, no greater treasure, no richer alms, no
more beautiful endowment, no more cherished possession than government, which creates and preserves
order."
Language and Li"terature. Back to the simul in the cabin
afe for one more illustration. It is in the sphere of humanistic languages and literature that Luther is most at
home. He saw himself as a grammarian, linguist, and
tran lator, and was proud of being "doctor of the Holy
cripture." Luther, says Gerrish, "wa not one to entimentalize about the 'simple preacher of the faith': 'expo itors' are what is needed, therefore language al o."
Heinrich Boehmer and other cholar have sugge ted
that 'as far as critical acumen i concerned [Luther] was
at least the equal of the renowned Era mu ." But thi is
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not the place to discuss competences or to play "We're
Number One" but to pursue the substance of the matter.
In languages and literature, as so often, Luther took
a simul view that sometimes appears on a time scale: ante
ftdem and post /idem. Before faith such tools, administered by reason, are bad; after faith, they are good. Just
as often he uses the context of "without faith" and "in
faith." Yet the final consistency is situational. In the
vantage of God looking at the user of linguistic tools to
gain favor, they are worse than nothing; when accepted
as gifts by a favored one, they are benefits. Reason, language, naturalia, "regenerated," involve the believer humanistically more than were he or she not drawn to
faith.
If languages and literature are the strongest case for
the humanities in this context, I make less of them because Luther has it too easy. He would rescue them instrumentally if the case were not there intrinsically.
They are of such aid in spreading the message of the
Bible. One quotation, cited by Roland Mushat Frye in
his Perspectives on Man, ought to make that clear enough
to keep literature departments in the humanities happy:
I am persuaded that without knowledge of literature pure theology
cannot at all endure , just as heretofore, when letters have declined
and lain prostrate, theology , too, has wretchedly fallen and lain
prostrate; nay , I see that there has never been a great revelation of
the Word of God unless He has first prepared the way by the rise
and prosperity of languages and letters, as though they were John
the Baptists .... Certainly it is my desire that there shall be as many
poets and rhetoricians as possible, because I see that by these studies ,
as by no other means , people are wonderfully fitted for the grasping
of sacred truth and for handling it skillfully and happily .

IV
This argument that in the heart of the Reformation,
where Luther has often been portrayed as an heir of
Christian Humanist who was anti-humanist, there was
also a true humanitie impulse eem directed at times
at the Lutheran who denies humanism or the humanist
who simply exclude religion. But in recent years a
challenge to the "human" a pect of the humanities has
risen within the academy it elf. In its face , contributions
like tho e from the Luther-ans may be urgent.
On one level anti-humanism ha ari en in th academy in a time when the Enlightenment, Reason, ienc ,
and the like are b ing clip ed, attacked, or di placed.
The e are not the day to peak up for rea on or inquiry,
progre or utopia, tolerance or civility or oth r a pect of the eighteenth-century humani m that hap d
much of the modern acad my. Whil th trib gath r
around the world, th y do not lack acad mic 1 itimator.
The new t chall nge to on em humani for whom
the' human" pun or ambiguity in 'humanitie matt r
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comes from various biologists, formalists, and structuralists. At the borderline of "arts and sciences" are
forms of ethology, sociobiology, psychological behavior.ism, and various projection theories, all of which are
reductionist about what texts and traces disclose concerning the human drama. Each explains away impulses that were once seen as being distinctively human.
Man is no longer the measure of all things; Protagoras
is dethroned. And the "race" dignified by a God who
"deigns to dwell with it" is not the subject of humanistic
concern.

Anti-Humanism in the Humanities
This is not the place to detail the array of anti-humanisms in the humanities, but only to point to areas
of concern. Thus defenders of semiotics as the newest
of the humanistic disciplines see it having a "vast domain: it moves in, imperialistically, on the territory of
most disciplines of the humanities and social sciences"
and replaces human intentionality with semiotic investigation (Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction). Historians like Michel
Foucault, on the soil of the humanities, banners structuralist and semiotic thinking: "man is only a recent
invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a simple
fold in our knowledge" which will soon disappear. Humanistic anthropology moves in a similar direction
where structuralism prevails. Claude Levi-Strauss:
"The goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man
but to dissolve him." Foucault again, "The researches
of psychoanalysis, of linguistics, of anthropology have
'decentered' the subject in relation to the laws of its
desire, the forms of its language, the rules of its actions,
or the play of its mythical and imaginative discourse."
These attacks on the human subject have gone far
enough that literary critic Frank Lentricchia of the
University of California at Irvine reports (in After the
New Criticism):
Judging by their published responses , talks (and talk) at Modern
Language Association conventions , and remarks that I have overheard in the vicinity of the departmental coffee pot at various universities, it appears that the traditionalist opposition [to these tendencies in criticism , for example] has not been able to resist expressing (not entirely without cause) condescension , smugness , disbelief,
ironic cool , and downright anger. Predictably , its members have
tended to characterize the enemy as barbarians bent on destroying
all human values (with 'humane' a synonym in the traditionalist
lexicon for all things civilized, all things good and to be cherished).

Frederick Olafson wrote his book as a counterattack
to structuralism in literature and formalism in history
as being "antihumanistic" and given over to scientism.
He set out to find a "model" of the human that would
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resist such reduction:
... structuralism .. . has devaluated the role of the person and the
person-based teleological organization of the Lebenswelt in favor of
an analysis of the semantic and syntactical properties of systems of
discourse for which the person serves as hardly more than a contingent vehicle .. . . It has also taken the form of a repudiation of the
conceptions of agency and temporal continuity on which the older
historical humanism had laid such emphasis ; and a rhetoric of antihumanism has developed which proclaims "man"-the homo humanus who is at once the denizen and the demiurge of the Lebenswelt-to be a conceptual artifact of the nineteenth century and
scheduled for an early demise.

An interesting irony may be developing here. While
Christian humanists have been fending off anti-humanist "spiritualizers," "transcendentalists," and "activists"
who allow no time or space for the humanities under the
Christian sun, on another flank the traditional subject
of humanistic inquiry, the human, is jeopardized in the
central humanities. What to do?
One could call in an Inquisition and say that churchrelated colleges should make no room for behaviorists,
sociobiologists, structuralists, semioticians, and the like.
No, one could not. Better to use such colleges as forums
for inquiry concerning these current antihumanistic
paradigms. In an era of planned obsolescence in "poststructuralisms" and literary fads, it may be that people
with a Christian view of history can buy time, can provide a "this, too, will pass" perspective, or help find
ways to distinguish wheat from chaff in the new movements of inquiry. Certainly one goes nowhere by evading or shunning main currents of research in one's own
time. Better to pass through them, as a Paul Ricoeur
has done in the field of post-structural hermeneutics.
It is interesting that a recent book on structuralism
and its age (Edith Kurzweil, The Age of Structuralism:
Levi-Strauss to Foucault) devotes most of its pages on "humanism" to the chapter on Ricoeur-a French Protestant and thus from a tradition long seen as antihumanistic. Ricoeur is finding ways to show again how texts,
particularly narrative texts, are disclosive of human
situations.
Standing between antihumanists in church and academy, humanities humanists and their colleagues in
sundry disciplines may be called to a new role. In the
Lutheran setting, when they learn how extravagantly
they can praise and pursue the creaturely subject from
one vantage of the simul approach, theirs may be a new
vocation. Instead of giving grudging assent or making
weak apologies for the validity of das irdische Reich the
earthly kingdom, and of the human in the mundane
order, it is this kind of Christian humanist who may find
it necessary and possible to say the "highe t" kinds of
things about the reach of the humanities and the grandeur of creation and the human subject.
Cl
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Catholicism, Marxism, and Liberation
Thoughts on the Church's
Political Involvement

Peter Augustine Lawler

Events in Poland and Latin America have brought
the Catholic Church's involvement in political affairs
to the front page of newspapers throughout the world.
The contribution of Church leaders to admirable and
even heroic opposition to political oppression has enhanced the Church's reputation among free human
beings everywhere. Certainly, the Marxian accusation,
which is actually found in much of modern or "enlightenment" political thought, that Christianity is
nothing but a popular opiate which dulls the human
desire to strike out against those who deny human
beings freedom, dignity, and material well-being has
lost much of its credibility. Few today dare to deny
that the Church has freed itself from a destructive
tendency to ally itself with futile and wrongheaded
efforts to reverse the egalitarian revolutions which
swept and continue to sweep the world.
This having been said, we should not gloss over the
difference between the Polish and Latin American
situations or the Church's response to each of them.
They should provoke serious thought, and this thought
should lead us to careful reflection on the proper response of the Church to contemporary political movements.
In Poland, the Church opposes not merely a particular Marxist regime but Marxism itself. Intoxicated
by quick and unexpected successes, its supporters are
sometimes foolhardy enough today not even to veil
that fact in their public pronouncements. In Latin
America, many Church leaders have openly allied
themselves with Marxian revolutionaries, while others
are more cautious but still acknowledge the basic identity of genuinely Christian and Marxian political goals.
Polish theologians, of which the present pope is a
brilliant example, tend to be doctrinal "traditionali ts." They emphasize the "transpolitical" character of
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Christianity. For them the scope of the Church's mission
transcends any given political regime, and, consequently, it must be free from political control. They
see the fundamental error of Marxism as its tendency
to politicize all of human life and hence to deny the
Church, the family , and other properly private human
associations their legitimate autonomy.
One of the first victories achieved by Solidarity,
the one generally considered by the Poles themselves
to be the most significant, is the Polish government's
grant to the Church of relatively free access to the
media, the purpose of which is unfettered communication with the Catholic faithful on religious matters.
For the Polish Church, which is hardly insensitive to
the questions of political freedom and material wellbeing, the primary question concerning political legitimacy is the extent to which the Polish regime recognizes its freedom.
Today, Church leaders tend to counsel a prudent
restraint to Solidarity leaders in order that they not
endanger what has already been achieved and in view
of what realistically can be expected in the fore eeable
future. Political revolution, for the Polish Church, is
not good for its own sake. It must be evaluated by its
likely effect on the full range of human goods, the most
important of which can be pur ued only if political
control over human activity is limited.
Latin American theologian tend to b "revolutionaries"; they identify the Church' mi sion with the
task of radical political lib ration. Th y e k to politicize Christian acts and ymbol by connecting the
Biblical mes age of alvati n with the hi torical tran formation of the wretch d ituation of the great ma
of human being . They a rt that Chri tian mu t not
re t until very human b ing i r cogniz d in hi freedom and dignity by the political and conomic
t m .
To as ert that th Church' mi ion i in any way "tran political," for th th ologian of lib ration i to a quie c ne dle ly in th oppre iv p liti al and
economic status quo; it i
to giv aid and omfort to th oppre or .
th n, ma and p rhap mu t ally them Iv
r
luti nary m
m n that har th g nuin 1y hri tian al f radi al
lib ration, v n if th mov m n do not a kn , 1 d
th truth of th Chri tian faith.
JS

From the perspective of the future of the Church, the tendency toward the complete and uncritical
identification of Christianity with Marxian political goals presents unprecedented dangers.

There is also reason to suspect that there is a foundation for more than a mere alliance here. If we accept the
widely held view that Marxism is, at its core, nothing
but "secularized" Christianity, that is, a doctrine which
purports to show that Christian otherworldly goals can
be achieved in this world, that is, in history and that,
in fact, they must be achieved in history because history
is all there is, and if the central goal of liberation theology is to eliminate otherworldliness from Christian
striving by fully politicizing or historicizing Christ's
teaching, then we must conclude that we see in liberation theology not a synthesis of Marxism and Christianity but rather a projected transformation of Christianity into Marxism.
It is easy to see why so many well-meaning Catholics
and other Christians are, in effect, becoming Marxists
once we acknowledge that Marxism can plausibly be
understood as fully politicized or historicized Christianity. There must be, after all, a place for genuinely
Christian political activity. We must concede that the
laudable desires to eradicate the misery of the oppressed and to universalize human dignity are genuinely
Christian ones, and, in some circumstances, effective
change in the human situation may require participation in the overthrow of autocratic and oppressive
regimes. It is difficult, for example, to see how sincere
Christians could refrain from opposing the arbitrary
violence and cynicism of the regime in Guatemala, and
even the "traditional" doctrine of natural law and the
papal social encyclicals would call into question this
regime's legitimacy. (But candor also compels us to
admit that the situations in El Salvador, Argentina,
and Brazil are a good deal more ambiguous than the
liberal media usually acknowledges.)
From the perspective of the future of the Church,
however, the tendency toward the complete and un-
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critical identification of Christianity with Marxian
political goals presents unprecedented dangers. There
is the "theoretical" or theological danger of the destruction of the transpolitical or transhistorical dimension of Christianity. Liberation theology, I think,
often masks a loss of faith. As Alexandre Kojeve informed the world in his remarkable Marxian interpretation of Hegel's thought, Hegel's argument for
the view that history is all there is is really the first
fully consistent argument for atheism. Liberation theologians tend to accept this crucial Hegelian view, but
they refuse to affirm all its implications. They remain
Christians, it appears, by refusing to be consistent.
Such inconsistencies cannot maintain their credibility
indefinitely, at least among thoughtful persons, although they may remain useful as rhetorical ploys to
influence those who combine good intentions and pure
ideals with intellectual weakness or indolence.
There is also a more practical danger, which also
stems from Marxian theory. What is to become of the
Church once Marxian revolutionary movements succeed? The suppression of the Church in exisiting Marxist regimes is not due to a series of accidental deformations of the revolutionary ideal. The consistent Marxist
must argue that religion is unnecessary once the revolution has succeeded. The human needs which religion
seemed to satisfy in oppressive times, but in fact did
not, can really be satisfied historically or politically
(that is, by the only true means of satisfaction) once
oppression is eradicated. Those at the end of history
who still perceive the need for religion are literally
insane, because they are unable to perceive their true
situation.
In the decisive sense, liberation theology points to
the demise of Christianity once liberation is achieved;
man himself will have completed the Christian project
through his imitation of Jesus Christ, liberator. One
might argue that the revolution ought never to end
because liberation is never complete, but Marxists in
power typically deny the need for any further radical
transformations. The revolution will be complete
when they perfect their control over human activity.
The antidote for Catholics tempted by the excesses
of liberation theology is reflection on the Polish experience, where the Church must struggle to free itself
from Marxist domination. Its remarkable success there
indicates that there is truth to the traditional teaching
that Christianity really does have a transpolitical or
transhistorical dimension because the human person
has such a dimension. From a Christian perspective,
freedom means, in part, freedom from political control,
and the Church must remain wary of the totalitarian
implications of Marxism or "secularized" Christianity
for its own good.
Cl
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From
The
Chapel
The University
As Prophet

Fredrich H. Thomforde, Jr.

The University has a prophetic
function, but it should never
presume to speak as if it had been
granted specific and detailed
answers to the cri tical human
dilemmas we all face . The true
prophet lays before us the necessity
of choice and action, but he does
not presume to make our choices for
us. The prophetic role has to be
carried out in great humility.
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Even as we pause to celebrate this moment in the
life of the University, the endless swirl of abrupt,
violent, and seemingly uncontrollable events that define
the context of our existence continues. No human soul
remains untouched. Ultimately each of us will cry out
from the darkness of the belly of hell: Who am I?
There have been those sent from God, prophets
crying in the wilderness of our existence. Prophets but
not fortune tellers; prophets but not mere doomsayers;
prophets in the broader and theological sense: ordinary
humans, but blessed with more than ordinary spiritual
insight; proclaimers, interpreters, and spokes~en for
the revealed Word.
In the darkness of the late twentieth century, this
university is called to be prophet, called to use its
extraordinary cumulative gifts and insights to interpret
and proclaim the revealed Light. I make this claim not
as metaphor but in earnest. The assertion is neither
blasphemous nor presumptuous. The Light has manifested
itself to us and dwells among us. "The Lion hath
roared, who will not fear? The Lord God hath spoken,
who can but prophesy?" (Amos 3:8)
The assertion that this community has a prophetic
function is not to be understood as implying that any of
us alone has the burden or the gift of prophecy. It is
the institution, the community, that is called as
prophet. It is in community- in Bonhoeffer's sense of
the term-that the Word reveals itself: through you to
me, through me to you. It is through community that we
experience and therefore know the truth. It is through
the cumulative insights of its members that this
community is able to interpret, proclaim, and reflect the
Light, to carry out its prophetic role.
Unfortunately, the difficult issues facing the
nation and the world in our immediate time have too
often been clouded rather than enlightened by those
divines whose particular solutions to fundamental
problems of existence are offered as revealed truththat is, as true prophecy-rather than as possible,
finite responses to the prophecy. It is a confu ion
that results from the failure to recognize an apparent
paradox: the Truth revealed to us is ultimate reality,
but the truth revealed to us is not solution to finite
problems.
The Truth that has manife ted itself to u
is that the Lord God, who ha created u , who knows u ,
has expectations for u for which we are held
accountable. That part of the revelation i the ource
of our terror-of ultimate judgment for failure-and
al o the ource of the prophet' t mptation to go
beyond what he ha b en giv n and to pro laim and
pre cribe as part of th rev al d prophecy preci l
how each of us i tom et God' exp tation .
I have b n giv n th truth that I mu t d id
under the threat of judgm nt, but I ha not b en gi n
an wer . I have b en point din th ri ht dir ti nlo e my neighbor ven a
d ha lo d m - but thi
a hallmark again t which m choi e ill b jud d, n t
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a particular solution. As Martin Buber has suggested,
the true prophet lays before me the necessity of choice,
of human action, but it remains my terrifying choice.
The temptation is to go beyond the revelation that I
must decide, to further proclaim that which has not been
revealed; that is, to proclaim what I must decide, to go
beyond the revelation that God will judge to proclaim
the prophet's own judgment. The prophet confuses the
prophecy-which is God's insight to man-with his own
mortal insights about existence under the prophecy. The
prophet is not exempt from the prophecy.
And exactly while some contemporary prophets go
beyond the prophecy, it also appears to me that they .
proclaim only part of what has been revealed. For
though God has indeed revealed his expectations for me
and although I will be judged, God has also revealed
that which the prophet Jonah knew, but which he
resisted: that God is "a gracious God and merciful"
(Jonah 4:2): "And should not I spare Ninevah, that
great city, wherein are more than six score thousand
persons that cannot discern between their right hand
and their left hand?" (Jonah 4:11) This is not a
proclamation of abstract mercy, but the promise of mercy
in the face of our inability perfectly to live up to His
expectations for us. Yet our ears hear much selfrighteous condemnation proclaimed as revealed insight,
but too little proclamation of the complete revelation.
To me there is a frightening deception in the
proclamation of certain contemporary prophets who
emphasize judgment, an emphasis that comes intimately
intertwined with the self-deception which equates an
answer to our critical human dilemmas with the answer,
and worse, as the revealed answer.
This University is called to continue as an active
voice and faithful in the prophetic tradition simply
because to it, as community, has been revealed that
Light which removes the chill despair of darkness. For
God has answered our anguished cry: who am I? He has
answered in Christ and before Christ with the revelation
of his Grace. When God, through the prophet Nathan,
revealed the promise of his grace to David, David turned
the words "who am I" from a question of despair to one
of peace and awe. (I Chron. 17) Who am I that God
should be so good to me? One writer's attempt to
verbalize David's reaction to the revelation of God's
grace resulted in the simple words of the beautiful
hymn: ''Amazing Grace! how sweet the sound that saved a
wretch like me! I once was lost, but now am found, was
blind, but now I see." (John Newton)
We are grateful today for the Seegers family's
expression of faith in the prophetic role of this
school. And I and hundreds of other former students
are grateful for Professor Bartelt's example of
steadfast faith in the prophetic role of this
University and for his example of humility and
compassion in living under the prophecy. In Luce Tua
Videmus Lucem.

Joseph and Mary
Joseph,
who had pounded many a door
with mallets, chisels,
and his own gnarled hands,
knuckled hard on this one
which proclaimed an inn
but held him out.
He eyed the heavy hinges
sunk in solid cedar,
the stubborn iron latch set firmand softly cursed closed doors
that wall.
Distracted,
he had happier thoughts:
"If this soon mother bears a son,
I'll teach him how
to build stout doorshow to adze the uprights;
how to set the boards across,
how to drive the nails .... "
Mary,
reconciled to waiting,
caught her breath
and winced
at visions of a Son
who would himself become
the door.

Born-Again Christ
Jesus was no baby phase
that God went through
and then outgrew.
God still comes down to birth
on earth.
In Christ he Christmases anew.
Through these Decembering days
I too
will manger him
whose birth is now.

Bernhard Hillila

••••
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History and Women
The Profession Nourishes New Roots

Sally Gregory Kohlstedt

The study of women's history has significance for historians, humanists, and all of us as individuals. Women's
history, I will argue, has established new roots for contemporary historical inquiry and, to pursue the metaphor, is producing foliage at the top which is filling in,
enlarging, and reshaping the many-branched bush
which constitutes history.
Women, of course, are eternally present. Their history is elusive, however. Chroniclers included accounts
of women such as Helen of Troy and Cleopatra, and
ancient and medieval women recorded their own situations in journals or in poetry, but only recently has the
history of women become an obvious and significant
part of professional history. The discovery (or recovery)
of women from the past has gone through several stages
and indicates at least three incentives which I will call
compensatory, activist, and integrationist. These categories
correspond as well to a model of the development of
this young field of history: first, a period of investigation and discovery of data to fill in the existing record;
second, the establishment of a distinct area of study, the
history of women, with its own themes and integrity;
and third, the integration of new knowledge into traditional narratives and explanations, a process which will
ultimately reshape the questions historians ask and the
interpretations they propose.
Elements of all three categories operate in historical
study now. Each phase has a place in the phenomenon
that is producing new journals (Signs and Feminist
Studies, for example), entire conferences on special as-
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pects of women's history, and new courses on women's
history as well as revised surveys of American history,
Western Civilization ... and perhaps other area studies
as well.

I
Compensatory hi"story is necessarily a stage as well as an
incentive and it establishes and nourishes those roots of
human inquiry which can stimulate new growth. Initially compensatory history was a recognition that women were missing in standard historical works. Caught
up in the challenges of other minority history and influenced by the women's movement, historians and educators uncovered what had been written about their
foremothers. By simply counting the number of women
mentioned in textbooks (as some quantitatively-minded
individuals did in the late 1960s), women scholars established a pattern of underrepresentation.
Digging deeper into established records of wellknown events, enterprising historians enriched accounts
of early textile manufacturing in New England and the
development of the common school system by the more
thorough cultivation of the sources and by identifying
new branches of inquiry. In addition to reinve tigating
topics in which women's participation is known, historians found how much could be learned about women'
lives by tudying the "family" letter of famou men in
archive of educational and ocial ervice in titutions,
and in the local historical societie traditionally run by
those dedicated and practical little old ladie in tenni
shoes who con cientiou ly pre erved the records of women in any case. Moreov r, the research on th
material produced re ult that immediat ly d mon trated
how varied and important worn n' role had b en in
tho e standard hi torical v nt publiciz d in uch
chronicle a
listair Cook ' America.
The merican Revolution off r a ca
in p int:
Wheth r our view of th cau
and pro cution of th
Revolution i economi or id ol ical th d
lopm nt involv d worn n. Traditional t xt p int ut that
th chall ng to Briti h authority in olonial
cam from patriotic m n who ath r d in 1
a mbli or in tavern and oth r publi pla
te t Briti h p liti and p lici
numb r
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Compensatory women's history fills in essential details in basically traditional historical
narratives and explanation; the shape and nature of the discipline remains essentially unchanged.

documented events between 1764 and 1775 brought the
American crisis to Parliamentary attention and led
British authorities to try to crush the rebellion. Press
attacks on Tory leaders and the outspokenness of ardent
radicals like Thomas Paine were important-equally
dramatic and effective were the series of boycotts against
items which the colonists felt either should be manufactured in the colonies or were being taxed unfairly.
Who conducted the boycotts? The family was the ecqnomic unit for consul"'1er goods, and women in cities
often were the consumers.
There is considerable evidence that women's efforts
to manufacture homespun effectively limited the importation of British goods. Even more to the point of
the Revolution, women led the boycott to protest the
tax on tea by making the alternative home brews of
raspberry, sage, and birch. They also challenged merchants who hoarded items during the harbor crises and
the war itself. One of the more amusing incidents occurred shortly after the outbreak of war when, Abigail
Adams recorded:

vention. Historians have now elaborated on women's
leadership in the Civil War Sanitary Commission and
Freedman's Bureau, the relief and consumer activities
coordinated by Suffragist Anna Howard Shaw during
World War I, and the efforts of Rosie the Riveter and
her coworkers during World War II. Compensatory
history has also supplemented accounts of reform activities by noting women's petition and fund drives for
abolition, their local political and social successes during the progressive period, and their role in the black
and white civil rights movements of the twentieth century.
The response to the observation that history has failed
to recognize women's participation has been to create a
goldmine of new research as well as bibliographical aids
to guide researchers to promising sources. Yet, overall,
compensatory history fills in essential details in basically traditional historical narratives and explanation;
the shape and nature of the history bush remains relatively unchanged by such work.

II
One eminent, wealthy, stingy merchant (who is a bachelor) had a
hogshead of coffee in his store, which he refused to sell the committee
under six shillings per pound. A number of females , some say a hundred , some say more, assembled with a cart and trunks , marched
down to the warehouse, and demanded the keys , which he refused
to deliver. Upon which one of them seized him by his neck and
tossed him into the cart. Upon his finding no quarter, he delivered
the keys when they tipped up the cart and discharged him ; then
opened the warehouse, hoisted out the coffee themselves , put it into
the trunks and drove off. ... A large concourse of men stood amazed ,
silent spectators of the whole transaction.

Throughout the Revolution women expanded their
usual duties, taking responsibilities for farms and businesses, sustaining Washington's army during the traumatic winter at Valley Forge, and serving as spies when
it became evident that their passage across enemy lines
was less suspect. Women served both sides, loyalist and
patriot; there is nothing in the historical record to suggest women are "by nature" radical or conservative.
Women used their wits on every level. Mercy Otis
Warren, member of the revolutionary-minded Otis
family, contributed to the evolving theoretical arguments for revolutionary action. Some scholars think
that it was she who created the concept of committees of
correspondence, the essential communication network
among the thirteen politically autonomous rebelling
colonies. She wrote pamphlets and plays during the
course of the war to keep up the morale of the soldiers
and later challenged John Adams when she fel.t he betrayed revolutionary principles during his Presidency.
Similar examples of "adding" women into the commonly discussed periods and crises of history could be
cited. Women typically have taken unprecedented responsibility during war, willing and able to defy con-
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In the process of adding women to the existing record,
however, some scholars have become activist. They seek
to learn more about women's own life experiences, asking questions about women that are not generated by the
political, economic, and diplomatic events which most
often outline the historical record. Simone de Beauvoir's book, The Second Sex, astutely identifies women's
position as the "other" with regard to male-dominated
events and perceptions. Indeed, women have another
history, one which often revolves around activities and
relationships exclusive to women. Not surprisingly women historians, and some men as well, have begun to
ask questions which would have been relevant to women of previous generations. Inspired and guided by
some pioneering historians of women from the 1920s
who conducted preliminary research on lives of colonial
women, they are determined to discover and interpret
the nature and texture of women's lives.
One cluster of scholars has emphasized that women
share with each other private rituals and public purposes and that cooperation and community were the
norm, at least in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Particularly in the latter century, women viewed
their lives as a "sphere," with domestic duties in the center and around the core concentric circles of interest
and responsibility which widened throughout the period, first through church and missionary support, then
into local community welfare and educational projects,
and finally into national and decidedly secular activities such as juvenile law and prohibition by the end of
the century.
The Cresset

Women's lives were not linear, not identified with a career ladder. Their goals were multiple
and their interests necessarily diverse, opening simultaneously in several directions.

The image of circle is significant-women's lives
were not linear, not identified with a career ladder.
Their goals were multiple and interests necessarily diverse, opening simultaneously in several directions.
There were exceptions, of course, but the language and
concept of cycle are everywhere, reinforced by a sense
of rhythm and repetition implicit in such activities as
weaving, spinning, seeding, and rocking the cradle. Women shared private rituals, including girlhood friendships that persisted through life, the exchange of letters
and handicrafts, the intimacy shared during pregnancy
and childbirth, and the responsibility for overseeing
death and burial. A recent book by Nancy Cott, suggestively entitled Bonds of Womanhood, traces the elements
of women's communication with each other and points
out the fundamental emotional, social, and practical
implications of women's spheres.
Others in the activist group pursuing women's own
history search for the origins of feminism, decidedly a
women's movement. Mary Beard, a Progressive historian, wrote Women as Force in History suggesting that
women collectively are a force operating in the past and
present. Her book stresses biography, the struggles of
the eighty-year suffrage movement, and the reform
leaders who challenged the political, economic, and
social constraints imposed on women, as distinct from
men. Discrimination and oppression are real and found
their place in her account of the past.
Whatever their politics and empathies, leading historians of women such as Gerda Lerner (current president of the Organization of American Historians),
Nancy Cott, Mary Ryan, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg
argue that women's history has its own chronology,
structure, leaders, and issues. Women educators have
found it easy to empathize with the young teacher Susan
B. Anthony when she warned her fellow male teachers
at a state-wide convention in New York that if they allowed a different salary scale for women eventually they
would undermine their own salaries and job status.
Thus, women's history inevitably identifies a different
outlook on some issues and emphasizes particular events
as significant to their account.
ew dates mark important turning points: 1793publication of Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the
Rights of Women; 1848-Seneca Falls Women's Rights
Convention; 1911-the tragic Triangle Shirtwaist fire
in ew York that killed 147 women and underscored the
demands which led to the International Ladies Garment
Worker
nion; and 1920-the pas age of the women's
uffrage amendment. Topics like dome tic ervice (in
which up to 80 per cent of working women found employment in the nineteenth century) women' health
(treatment by phy ician and attitude toward the life
c de) , and imag of women (a bell
on umer or
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sex symbols) are standard topics in the new textbooks
on women's history.
Leading figures are Margaret Sanger, who dramatized
the birth control movement, and Transcendentalist
Margaret Fuller, who was a columnist for the New York
Tn.'bune and defied convention by marrying an Italian
revolutionary more than a decade her junior. Activist
history, with its own chronology, attentio~ to struggle
as well as success, and concern for movements without
political implications, offers entirely new branches of
history and is sustained by a deeply-rooted network of
new information. As pioneering scholars identify and
elaborate a new field for historians, they recover a tradition that will be valued by everyone who seeks a symmetrical genealogical tree.

III
The third stage, integration, is still being formulated.
Reinterpreting and reshaping the record of the past in
light of what we have discovered and recovered will be
the most difficult step. Compensatory and activist history are both essential to the final stage because they
generate new material which supplements and challenges traditional history. To return to the title metaphor, the roots of history have now been stimulated by
assiduous tilling of well-known primary sources and
enriched by the nutrients of new information. The results have been somewhat uneven growth of particular
branches-suffrage, labor history, domestic economy,
and so forth-but even the somewhat ungainly bush is a
more interesting specimen. Integration provides the
filling in, with appropriate pruning, which will shape
the shrub in such a way that it gains new trength and
appropriate symmetry.
The information about women in history - their contributions and their distinctive respon ibilities and
efforts-takes us to another level of analy is. Established
assumptions are probed by th data. Que tions are
raised: To what extent do women's liv s parallel m n'
lives? Do de criptive hi torical phra e like "frontier
experience," "indu trialization ," and " progre " mean
the same thing for women a they have meant for men ?
How accurate i our under tanding of out-group who
lack economic and political power? Que tion like th e
are not exclu ive to women' hi tory but hi torian of
women have led the effort to find n w ourc and to
take advantage of the tati tical and qualitativ t hnique ( uch a photographic analy i ) introduc d by
the "new o ial hi tory." At thi point th r
qu tion than an w r -and it i on thi i u
hi tory of women chall nge and may thu r hap hi tory in n ral that I would lik to turn m att nti n
n t.
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Women's history, with its elements of discrimination and other forms of social injustice, reminds
us of Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that American history too often denies the existence of evil.

Broad generalizations are most vulnerable. The interpretation of American history offered by Daniel Boorstin's trilogy on the American experience as expanding
democracy is not consistent with the assertions by historians of women that women had in some cases greater
economic and legal opportunity in the colonial period
than in the first half-century of the new republic; for
women, the revolution may not have brought positive
change or new freedom and opportunity. Similarly the
theme of individualism (even competition) as one essential component of American culture does not mesh
well with the realization that most women have led
lives of dependency on husbands, fathers, and brothers;
or, stated more positively, women have relied heavily
on networks and community, on kinship and friendship,
for both personal identity and for social reform.
Women's history brings many reminders of Reinhold
Niebuhr's suggestive book The Irony of American History which reminds us that American history too often
denies the existence of evil. Discrimination and other
social injustices are part of the historical record. There
is no room in the actual history of women for simply
sentimental notions of motherhood and respect for womanhood in bygone times when scholars recount mob
violence against women abolitionists and the ongoing
history of rape and wifebeating that have gone unpunished. There are indeed thorns on our bush of
history.
Rather than discuss abstractly the underside or alternative ways in which women's history fits the traditional
record, let me offer a few examples of scholars' efforts
to reconsider history with women in mind. Each is a
brief review of a more detailed and, I think, significant
essay.
David Potter, whose work on the subject of American
character is widely recognized, wrote an essay on women and the frontier in 1957 which challenged the major themes of Frederick Jackson Turner. Turner, you
may recall, argued that the West furnished a "new field
of opportunity, a gate of escape from the bondage of the
past" and that the individualism fostered on the frontier
invigorated American democracy. In response, Potter
cites the frontier aphorism: "This country is great for
men and dogs -but hell on women and horses."
Potter argues that historians cannot assume that a
theory which applies to men (assuming for the moment
that Turner's basic argument has not been challenged)
will necessarily hold true for women as well. Women,
Potter points out, continued to be defined in terms of
men whether in the family (as wife or daughter) or outside the family (as housekeeper or prostitute). Moreover, in their isolation from other women and the loss
of the networks they enjoyed in the East, they became
more dependent and less able to escape the confines of
22

domestic responsibility. Opportunities were circumscribed for the average woman settler on the predominantly agricultural frontier.
Just as the frontier has provided an organizing theme
for historical writing, the concept of industrialization is
commonly used to discuss social change. The standard
history of industrialization states that the work force
undergoes specific changes as industries mechanize and
rationalize. Several factors are inevitably mentioned:
first, the work force becomes highly differentiatedthat is, tasks are divided and delegated; second, individual workers become more specialized; third, managerial functions increase, while distance is created between workers and administrators; and fourth, the emotional content of the work disappears, especially pride
in the end product.
Recent work by historian of technology Ruth Cowan
has suggested that the construct may fit the world of factory workers confronting industrialization, but that
women facing new technology in the household at the
turn of the century and thereafter have had an entirely
different experience. In fact, she argues, taking on the
old verities one at a time, the reverse is true for the
household: 1) the work force becomes less differentiated
as domestic servants and some extended family members leave and as other chores once performed commercially (laundry, milk delivery) are delegated to the
housewife; 2) the homemaker becomes less specialized,
a jane-of-all-trades dealing with landscaping and interior design as well as being chief cook and bottlewasher;
3) the woman in the home is proletarianized as she becomes the manager and worker combined; and 4) finally the emotional content of her efforts increases as
she assumes the total responsibility for the home, and
her sense of self-worth becomes a function of her success at keeping children's shoes scuff-free and preventing ring-around-the-collar.
A third example of the challenges presented by new
research and a rethinking of old history is an account
of the nature of journalism history. Cathy Covert, a colleague of mine teaching in the school of communications at Syracuse University, pointed out assumptions
which dominate the history of journalism, namely:
journalism history is about winning-consider such
textbook chapters as "The press wins a beachhead,"
"the rise of the fourth estate," "the race for news," "champ£ons . . . great and colorful," and most frequently a
"revolution in communication"; journalism history is
about autonomy-note the identification of Woodward
and Bernstein as a type that is risk-taking, isolated from
colleagues and bosses, standing alone for truth and
justice; and journalism history is about change-again
such book and chapter titles as "progress of the press,"
"new breakthroughs in technology," and "the rise of vi The Cresset

Placing the grid of women's history over the traditional historical accounts will not, in a simple
act, produce a new coherent description of those changes and continuities which constitute history.

ual technology."
Like Cowan, Covert admits that these are merely
dominant themes and that exceptions exist. But she
projects a hidden underside of journalism history by
imposing questions raised by historians of women, and
she turns traditional accounts on their head. John Peter
Zenger, the colonial printer whose case is credited with
establishing at least symbolically the freedom of the
press, languished in jail even as his lawyers celebrated
their victory at a local pub; eventually he died a pauper,
having won a legal victory but lost the support of local
political leaders.
The failure of individuals to create careers and the
failure of magazines to establish themselves is, she argues, very much a part of the history of newswriting.
Women's struggles and failures are also a cogent reminder that failure is the counterpart to success. Nor is
autonomy always the appropriate image for a media
with syndicated stories, teams of reporters, and literally
networks of communication. Community and cooperation may well be themes relevant to history that is beyond the confines of the new women's history. Moreover, journalism reflects society, and change is no more
likely than continuity. The press conserves in many
ways the culture it reflects-and is often cited as a barometer of public opinion. To quote a nineteenth-century woman journalist, the press posits "a sense of relationships, values and relative proportions" and leads
readers to discern "the meaning of their times." Without
themselves creating a new history, these authors suggest that the substance and themes of women's history
may change our entire view of the past.
My comments are really questions, all probing the
direction of future historical work. Individualism and
opportunism may not apply to all who went West. Technology may lead those at work in industry and those in
private settings down quite individual paths. Entire
areas of historical inquiry, such as journalism history,
may need to question fundamental assumptions. But
what next? The challenge is not sufficient in itself to
formulate a resolution.
The challenge to historians is very broad, as Pulitzer
Prize winner Frances Fitzgerald has pointed out in her
recent bookAmerica Revised. Fitzgerald argues that current historical textbook revisions have left only an eclectic set of events and individuals who e story lacks coherence and direction.
Historical textbooks have been shaped, he argues,
by committee and in the midst of controver y between
minoritie and the majority and b parents and teacher
on the political right and political left. The compromi e
i an incoherent, even incomprehen ible hi tory that
provide no meaning. I hare the irritation but not the
e planation. A a practicing hi torian I think that the
December, 1981

confusion also reflects the multiplicity of new material,
exciting and important discoveries that must be integrated and not simply plugged in. Synthesis is perhaps
the most difficult stage.
Placing the grid of women's history (and black history
and working-class history, among other new fields)
over the traditional historical accounts will not, in a
simple act, produce a new coherent description of those
changes and continuities which constitute history. In
fact, there are seriously conflicting points of view of certain events, such as the role of the Suffragists who picketed the White House in 1918. Woodrow Wilson saw the
women as a danger to wartime unity; they saw him as
hypocritical in his support of democracy abroad yet lack
of commitment to the vote for women at home. In other
cases, information on men and women, placed side by
side, will show the two groups involved in different activities yet working for the same ends. History is the
study of conflict and of complementarity.
The few efforts to combine men's and women's history
in the past few years tend to stress distinctive roles and
experiences as, for example, John Mack Farrager's prizewinning book Women and Men on the Overland Trail. But
perhaps the distinctiveness he emphasizes is based on
the nature of his inquiry, which asks the usual questions
about work, about family responsibility, and about
visible community leadership. He is also interested in
women's networks and in their self-consciousness about
frontier life. What is largely missing is the relationships
between men and women generally or between the husbands and wives who had joined in the we tward trek.
Perhaps there is an androgeny in culture itself that we
have yet to fully perceive and understand; that is, every
culture may have characteristics which find expression
-ethical values, fine arts, technology as skill, economic
sensibility-and if ignored by one group or one gender,
may be ascribed or assumed by another.
Study of complementarity may challenge curr nt
assumptions about men' and women' role in u taining such norms and demonstrate how truly multi-functional each ex can be as indicated by their activiti at
different points in the hi torical r cord. Th ta k of the
next generation of historians mu t be to er at a ynthesis of men' and women' hi tory. Their hi tory
should not deny the con train and opportunitie that
exi ted in eparate phere but will find way to id ntify
the more complex picture of an entire culture of m n
and women moving coll tively through tim .
The tudy of worn n' hi tory pro id an
component for thi r writing hi tory mor g
By creating n w root , it has invigorat d and
that thorny, oft n ungainly hrub. Prop rl t n
r
pruned the pricker bu h of hi t
ma
magnifi ently.
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Television

Mobile Mythology
The Mass-Mediated
World of the Vidkids
James Combs
The world, some wag once noted,
is divided into two equal and irreconcilable groups: those people
who walk into rooms and turn
television sets on, and those who
walk into rooms and turn them off.
I confess I belong to the former
group: when entering, say, a motel
room, the first thing I do is turn on
the TV set and .fiddle endlessly with
it. This happens at home, too. Part
of my morning ritual is to flip the
channels while the bacon fries and
the body awakens to the existential
fact of the new day. After years of
trial-and-error, I have settled for
myself that the thing to watch in
the morn is "kidvid," programming
primarily directed at children.
It used to be the case that I would
wake up to adult fare- Today, Good
Morning America, and CBS Morning
News. But something was wrong:
after catching an hour or more of
news, plus reading the morning
newspaper, I found that by the time
I settled into work I was upset and
nervous. That "fix" of news, that unrelenting succession of tales of woe,
of threats and evils and wrongs, was
getting me do~ by 8:00 a.m. So I
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to The Cresset and Associate Prof essor of Political Science at Valparaiso
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Our children, to the extent they "live" in Kidvid,
possess what we might call a portable mythology.
switched. Now I watch cartoons,
Captain Kangaroo, and other kiddie
fare, and go to work in a much better frame of mind.
It is argued by some experts that
TV news teaches us "helplessness,"
i.e., we see on the news a world of
such enormous and insoluble problems that we . respond by not responding, feeling helpless in the
wake of what's happening "out
there." I think something like that
was happening to me. Watching
Bugs Bunny and the Roadrunner
is much more amusing, puts me in a
better frame of mind for the day,
and doesn't burden me with the
baggage of the world's news. Being
an "informed citizen" shouldn't
mean to the point of distraction.
My escape into the world of kidvid was serendipitous. I discovered
a whole new world, a world created for children by networks and
advertisers. I wondered, as do
parents, educators, psychologists,
and moralists, about what effect,
if any, all of this kiddie fare has on
all those children gazing at all those
TV sets across the country, and increasingly, across the world. One
can sense the concern in newspaper
articles: "What TV Does to Kids";
"TV ads hold child's gaze"; "'Most
violent' TV: Saturday cartoons";
"Too much TV could affect later
happiness." One hears tales of
children who commit "anti-social"
acts after seeing some TV show.
Other children are said to be passive, desensitized, bored by even
the most violent things after steady
exposure to television. The "plugin drug" is decried as an all-tooconvenient babysitter, as producing
a catatonic state in mesmerized
children, or as corrupting them at
a very early age by the cynicism of
the ads directed at them. Television
becomes the demon that destroys,
the medium with a subtly subversive
message, the latest in a long line of
teachers, dating at least to Socrates,
who are deemed evil because they

corrupt youth.
Social scientists worth their salt
are skeptical of such easy causal
theories, since the childhood difficulties TV "causes" existed before the advent of television, and
since, in any case, television is only
one of the influences on children.
The best evidence that media students can come up with is much
more equivocal, suggesting that
while television produces both positive and negative effects on those
who watch it, the precise nature and
extent of those effects remains
undetermined. Even though the
logic of the TV-teaches-and-corrupts
argument makes sense, the evidence
to support it is still something
less than conclusive. Let us remember what David Hume said
long ago about the difficulties of
establishing cause and effect, and
proceed with caution in blaming TV
for psychic states and social acts
remote from it in time and place.
There is, however, another way of
approaching this, a way which assumes that TV teaches, but focuses
on what is taught. Television shows,
after all, are about something, and
it is the content of these shows that
people, including kids, watch and
learn from. We include in that both
overt, manifest content, and the
more subtle, covert messages imbedded in shows. We may also assume that the people who make
children's TV shows are very much
aware of what their audience will
"accept" and what they won't, and
that their shows are in that case
something of a popular indicator
of what children identify with. In
any case, a look at the figures and
stories of Saturday morning TV and
other kiddie slots is instructive.
Children's TV is another one of
those cultural artifacts that tells us
much about ourselves. Our children ,
to the extent they "live" in kidvid
possess what we may call a portable
mythology, a world of heroes, villains, fools demons and monster
The Cresset
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Saturday morning TV reflects one of the subtle changes in popular consciousness
over the past two decades: the decline in the belief in traditional heroism.
great adventures and deeds, in short
all the features we associate with a
romantic, even gothic, imagination.
It's all there on TV. But it is not
permanent in the way that the Greek
or Arthurian legends, or even the
American Western, are permanent.
The figures and tales of kidvid come
and go. There is no single set of
cultural tales that is told and retold.
Rather like nighttime television,
the shows and characters appear and
disappear. One of the most delightful of all children's shows was
Bullwinkle, but unless today's kid~
can get it on re-runs, they will have
no idea who Bull~inkle and Rocky
and Boris and Natasha are. Theimpermanence of kidvid runs even to
ads: Ronald McDonald is a mythical figure right now for kids, but
McDonald's may decide on a new
company rep in a few years, and
Ronald will disappear from the tube
and from the consciousness of our
children.
It is no great revelation that
America is an impermanent society,
and that television in particular
contributes to that impermanence.
Even Walter Cronkite is gone now,
and soon Captain Kangaroo will
be too. (Someone has suggested
that they are actually the same
person.) If it is the case that our
children experience a kind of
mythic impermanence, are their
lives richer or poorer? They seem
to accept without much quibble
the succession of shows designed
for them, and to consume new
mythologies as they are created.
Peanuts, The Muppets, and Star Wars
are three new mythologies that
children accepted (although Star
Wars is in a sense the Arthurian
tory set in outer space). Such
creations do indeed have much
identity with traditional mythologie , except that they don't have
folk roots. They are what folklori t Richard Dor on call
fakelore ' mythologie
created for
p ific con umer audience
in
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this case children. In one sense,
the kids' mythic experience is enriched by the vast array and ingenuity of new mediated mythologies. But in another sense it may
be poorer, at least in terms of believability.
I draw this inference again from
the content of kiddie shows. Beginning with programs like Bullwinkle, these shows began to play
the tale told less than "straight."
Apparently the creators of such
shows began to sense that these kids
were pretty smart and sophisticated,
and that they wouldn't accept anything that was straight and serious
mythology. The Lone Ranger became a bit much. So kidvid took on
an air of self-mockery, making fun
of myths, reversing roles, making
monsters and demons less than
menacing, villains less than evil,
and heroes rather antiheroic. A
glance at Saturday morning TV
soon convinces the critical viewer
that most of it is tongue-in-cheek,
a series of parodies on old themes,
in which heroes and villains struggle
in tales that no one takes too seriously.
One of the outstanding prototypes of this new mythology is
Spiderman, an alienated and existential antihero who loses every
battle except the last one. Spiderman is a reluctant superhero, a
bungler who is more often thrown
into conflicts than seeking them.
He is self-absorbed, would like to
be bereft of his superpowers, and
often expresses a sense of the a~
surdity of situations. He ays little
about the values he is defending,
and is certainly skeptical about
heroism. Similarly, the "Drac
Pack" consists of de cendant of
ancient fiends such as Dracula and
Frankenstein, only now they ar
£unloving, adventurou
and not
ery monstrou . One doe not e
much that i archetypically go d or
e il. It i hard for the kid atchin
uch fare to take either h ro or

villains too seriously, since they
don't take themselves too seriously.
One can only speculate on the
reasons and consequences of such
shows. What kind of mythic heritage has a child acquired if he or
she learns an impermanent and selfmocking mythology? . If heroes
don't take themselves too seriously,
then why should we? Perhaps that
is what is learned: mythology
teaches, and here it teaches that
heroism is less than heroic, motives
mixed, villainy clever if foiled, and
most every character a bit insincere.
Saturday morning television reflects one of the subtle changes in
popular consciousness over the past
two decades: the decline in the
belief in heroism. People still want
and need heroes, but are not inclined to make the "leap of faith"
necessary to believe. Children, as
TV consumers, demand heroes too,
but also expect that modicum of
self-mockery that makes heroism a
bit absurd. Perhaps such shows do
reflect
something
fundamental
about our state of mind now, as
refracted through the prism of TV
and our children's minds: our sense
of impermanence and absurdity
that makes us self-absorbed and
even a bit "distant" from our elves,
and that creates our inability to
sustain belief either in heroe or in
ourselves. When a culture b gins to
disbelieve in heroe and in what
Ernest Becker called "cultural
heroism," then mythology probably
doe become impermanent and mobile, and doe take on an air of
parody. Kid
nicker at traight
We tern , but njoy an ab urd
antihero uch a piderman. t what
tage of the development of a civilization uch chang in myth logy
oc ur i a matter of ome int r t
to cultural hi torian . P rhap
future hi torian will
in aturday mornin kid id a b llw th r
of chan
in m rican mythol
and ub qu ntl in m rican lif .
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In the face of myriad social challenges, it is
easy for Christians to become weary in well-doing.

The Eutychus
Syndrome
Our Social Problems
Unfortunately Outlast
Our Attention Span
Karl E. Lutze
Why in the Acts of the Apostles
does the Eutychus event warrant inclusion? A human interest episode?
Injection of gentle humor? A literary device to effect change of pace?
Eutychus is the young fellow mentioned in the 20th chapter of Acts.
Briefly capsulized, this is the story:
Paul had been at Troas only seven
days. He had had such a full schedule that now on his last night he was
trying to crowd in all the warnings,
counsel, and instructions he could
before leaving. He might never return to this place, nor see these
friends again (in his letter to Timothy he alludes to the hastiness of
his departure, mentioning a coat
and a briefcase of books and papers
he'd left behind at Troas).
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in the South.
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There was so much to say and
Paul's sermon got a bit long- "past
midnight," we are told. And Eutychus simply couldn't stay with it. Sitting on a window sill in the crowded
and probably stuffy room, he "fell
into a deep sleep" and tumbled out
of the window.
It wouldn't take an educational
psychologist to conclude that Paul's
preaching had gone beyond the
young man's attention span.
This can prove a very useful illustration for parents-they shouldn't
endlessly nag at their children; for
preachers-they should keep it
brief; for teachers-they should prevent boredom by varying the content and the manner of instructing.
There were the days when sermons would go on for an hour or
more. It's doubtful that many of the
listeners really heard it all-even if
they'd had their eight hours sleep
the night before. We've come to concede that people will be attentive
only so long, and no longer.
It was Senator Everett Dirksen of
Illinois a few years ago who said it
was inevitable that the Civil Rights
Act of his day would pass. Congress
and just about everyone else had
gotten the message that segregation
and second-class citizenship had to
end. The indignities and repression
to which blacks had been subjected
through the years were totally inconsistent with principles of justice
and with what the United States had
claimed to be. The eloquence of the
Roy Wilkinses and the Whitney
Youngs and theA. Philip Randolphs
and the Martin Luther Kings, together with the marches and sit-ins
and kneel-ins, ultimately moved
people.
But after only a relatively short
time America did a Eutychus. The
country that had been so moved slid
into nodding and became weary of
hearing any more, as if to say "if
anyone says another word about
race I'll scream!"

Then after years of going virtually
unnoticed (after all there were only
about a half-million of them compared to 21,000,000 blacks) the original residents of the nation had a
word for America. Taking a page
from the previous decade's history,
they pointed to broken treaties, to
abuses they had experienced, and
even to the way people referred to
them (Vine Deloria observed "we
probably would all agree that we are
relieved that, when Columbus arrived, he thought he was in India
and didn't think he'd arrived m
Turkey").
They marched. They went to
Washington. They invoked civil
disobedience. And, above all, they
stated their case clearly: they too
had been victimized by discrimination, segregation, stereotyping, and
injustice. And citizens of our country, churched and unchurched, were
moved and sought ways to respond.
For a while.
Then came the refugees; and
hearts and arms and communities
across the land opened up to the
strangers who were seeking refuge
from the tyrannies of poverty and
repressive governments. Now, some
several thousand refugees later, the
cry is heard "that's enough- let's
keep America for Americans" even though voices like Nobel Peace
Prize winner Poul Harding's remind us that almost all of us are ourselves children of refugees.
We all seem to find that our attention span can be so brief. In this past
decade more than ever we have been
warned that the world's energy
sources are waning. So we pooled
rides to work. We dimmed our
lights. We turned back our thermostats. For a while.
Traffic safety engineers and analysts have issued grave reports that
deaths on the highways are more
than those of the Viet Nam war. So
Congres and the media responded
with regulations that prohibited
speeds in exce s of 55 MPH, and the
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It's not that we merely get drowsy, start nodding, and fall asleep. There are so
many issues, so many places, so many voices desperately calling for our attention.
TV jingles insisted that we buckle
up for safety. The people, though
somewhat begrudging! y, agreed.
For a while.
Scientists appeared before leaders
in government and articles appeared
on the printed page and in television
specials presenting data to show us
how our air and water and earth are
falling victim to contamination, to
pollution, and to toxic waste. New
regulations called for catalytic converters for automobile exhaust systems. Tough pronouncements ordered the big corporations to stop
spewing filth from their stacks and
spilling poison into the rivers. And
the people applauded the actions.
For a while.
Reports on new findings about the
devastating effects of Hiroshima's
tragic day of disaster have not found
us unmoved and indifferent. Against
that backdrop, accounts of stockpiling nuclear bombs and warheadscapable of destroying everything on
earth several times- roused the people again. Concerned men and women of all ages took to the streets,
chanting their slogans and waving
the flags of peace and the placards of
protest. And the people in Washington received and read the letters
and wires that reached their desks.

And they pledged to support the
people in their search for world
peace. For a while.
In 1980 we determined not to forget the children of the world- the
neglected, the abandoned, the forgotten, the leaders of tomorrow.
Now we have moved from there
and set aside this year to focus on the
disabled.
And what will be next on our
agenda; what will cause us an ache
in the heart, a lump in the throat, a
tear in the eye? And what, we ask
hopefully, will be a helpful, significant, and effective response?
America has not been insensitive
to human need through the years.
But its attention span is so short.
Our attention span is so short.
It's not that we merely get drowsy,
start nodding, and fall asleep. There
are so many issues, so many places,
so many voices calling for our attention. And we acknowledge our limitations and admit that our priorities
usually deserve reordering.
Back to the story of Eutychus. The
account is not mere humor, an amusing tale. He was sitting in a building
three stories tall; Eutychus had a
very great fall, and, the account goes
on, it was nothing short of a miracle
that put Eutychus back together
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again.
The spirit of the Scriptures suggests that the message of the Eutychus story is not "stop preaching."
The message is "watch out for those
who are falling asleep."
Increasingly in our day people are
insisting that they're "sic~ and tired"
of always hearing about the poor,
and peace, and race, and ecology,
and love. Their diagnosis is correct.
It is a sickness -things are not
healthy when people stay weary.
When voices of those in national
leadership echo those of the "sick
and tired" there is need for caution.
When in the concern for "the economy" and "national interest" an eye
is closed to the needs of any of God's
people there is need for alarm.
But when even the people of the
church show evidence of being "sick
and tired" the situation is critical.
The prophet Elijah calls the children of God to the role of Watchman - the person who's not to fall
asleep. Ezekiel says, "blow the trumpet" (that ought to wake them up!)
to warn the people when principles
and practice of justice have wilted,
and, he adds, failure to sound the
warning places the sleepy trumpeter
under the condemnation of God.
Tough language.
The New Te tament puts it thi
way:

It' vital that we recognize th
" hort attention pan" factor in ourelve and in other . o it' our repon ibility to keep nudging on
another, and ven w lcom th
voice that k p whi p ring "nuclear wa te poverty third world,
El alvador qual ri ht '- oic
that won't all w u to d z off into
un one m and non-in l m nt.
It i our to k p Ii t nin t and rai in -the
f 1 in
cone rn for all p
nam
and pirit of J u
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By R. P. Blackmur. Edited and with an
introduction by Veronica A. Makowsky.
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1980. Pp. 354. Cloth, $19.95.

When your scrupulous critic takes
a long journey up the mountain of a
man's work, and then in his scrupulosity sinks mine shafts into the
mountain "for pure samples of human imagination," the results of the
critic's examination ought to be
worth waiting for. In this hectic age,
where not to be at the cutting edge is
to fall back into an apparent abyss,
shall we wait fifteen years? If the
mountain is Henry Adams (18381918) and the vintage critic is R. P.
Blackmur (1904-1965), perhaps and
more than perhaps.
For Henry Adams, the grandson
of a president, child of Beacon Street
and Quincy, secretary to his ambassador father in England during the
American Civil War, professor and
historian and novelist, friend of
presidents and statesmen and artists,
traveler and selective Washington
host, "intolerably reticent," as Blackmur speaks of him, and yet a man
who needed his pen to find his way
at all-this Henry Adams anticipated in his work much of where we
are and what we are in twentiethcentury America. In fact, when
Lewis Mumford revisited in 1956 his
The Golden Day of 1926, he made
reparations for his earlier neglect
of Adams when he wrote in a new
introduction, "when one has said
the worst about Adams, one must
admit that he and he alone, had both
the intelligence and the depth of in-
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Henry Adams anticipated in his work much of where
and what we are in twentieth-century America.
tmtlon to see something that was
invisible to most of his contemporaries: the disii;tegration of Western
Civilization. What is more, he put
his diagnostic finger on the very
spots in politics, technics, and
science, where the cancerous growth
had begun to develop." Twenty-five
years later we continue to recognize
that one younger critic who rescued
Adams from misunderstanding was
Blackmur.
Beginning in the late thirties,
Blackmur concentrated on Adams
as a significant American figure.
One pleasantly disturbing but instructive irony is that the collected
essays in this book bring a kind of
unity to a work Blackmur never
completed. What recommends the
work to those interested in American
letters is Blackmur's critical and
sympathetic account of Adams' considered treatment of energy. That
energy for Adams found its fullest
expression in human intelligence
and imagination seeking and failing
to run order through chaos, unity
through multiplicity. That great expense, particularly The Education of
Henry Adams, teaches us our ignorance, a superb education in failure.
Nevertheless, in assenting to failure,
men like Adams and Blackmur assert the high courage that reasoning
imagination brings to awareness in
its attempts to do what it cannot do:
stop the movement to death and
disorder and darkness.
In addition to Blackmur's central
occupation with Adams' theme, several other qualities commend the
work. First, through his commentary-really commentary as a form
of interpretation blended with criticism-Blackmur accents the ways
in which Adams' writing was a significant form of symbolic action.
The thinker as artist needs to shape
for himself and his reader those
images and symbols which express
with integrity and appropriate
nuance the depths and complexities
of human sensibility in the making.

As a historian and a contemporary
Adams was torn between his recognition of the ways "Christian culture
penetrated and enriched the recesses of the whole being," particularly from about 1215-1315 A.D. At
the same time he was skeptically
aware of a changing set of symbols
displacing those earlier vital Christian symbols. Blackmur summarizes, "The meaning of scientific and
economic law did not penetrate but
flattened out the beings who suffered from their operation, and did
so precisely because the powers they
dealt with had not been translated
or expressed in adequate symbolic
form." For those who have followed
that journey with Adams in The Education of Henry Adams, Blackmur's
acute rereading deepens our understanding of the scope, adroitness,
the pain and irresolution of Adams'
grasp of the problem.
Second, Blackmur deals like the
best of the New Critics with the
meaning and significance of the primary and secondary symbols and
images that cluster and group around
the central problem of energy and
form. These symbols and agents of
the forces at work in human culture
Blackmur helps bring to clarity in
Adams' work: woman in her sexual
and social capacity; love and the
atom; politics and the conflict between principles and the felt worth
of values; the temptations to surrender to the blind force and powers of
inertia; the need for intelligence informed by feeling, for feelings passing through the sufferance of intellect; the conflicts between and
among the subjective need to believe, the severe denials of the mind,
and the possibilities of yea-saying to
life. These interrelationships and
their accompanying symbols and
images-the virgin , the dynamo,
Chartres Cathedral and Mont-SaintMichel, Pteraspis, the spider and its
web, the begonia-received sharper
delineation through Blackmur'
inquiry.
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Jewett sees Christian male-female relations in terms of ideas of equality that allow
no differentiation between individuals except on the basis of functional competence.
Third, because Blackmur had
access to unpublished letters, we
get a further glimpse of the aging
Adams, whose skepticism and sophistication "richened the texture of
the imagination." That aging imagination in its final ironic wisdom
once replied to the question why
John Singer Sargent had not done
his portrait by going to a drawer
and bringing out a twelfth-century
portrait of the Nativity and pointing
to a donkey with its nose in the manger, "That is my portrait. ... It is the
donkey sniffing the straw." But
Blackmur's verbal portrait does not
end there. We ponder the anonymity
of Saint-Gaudens' statue at Rock
Creek, the monument Adams erected
in memory of his wife. For Blackmur that statue and Adams' watching the watchers was an enactment
of the courage and the truth of the
man. Blackmur concludes: "If there
are great believers, almost as great
are those who know the horror where
belief ends; for it is only through
them that we know what it is we believe, and lose, and must needs believe again. Adams was one of these."
That R. P. Blackmur approximates
the man he writes about gives the
reader a double glimpse of the mind
of our age.

Cl

Warren Rubel

The Ordination of Women
By Paul K. Jewett. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980. Pp. 148. Paper, $5.95.

The book cover of Paul K. Jewett's
book, The Ordination of Women,
features the proclamation by feminist ancy Hardesty: "Destined
to become a classic ... " While I
am probably not a good judge of
what is likely to become a cla ic
among feminists, I doubt Jewett'
book will become a clas ic, and I
doubt it was intended b him to
be one.
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One of his other reviewers stated
emphatically, "Jewett's case is a
powerful one." I do not concur, and
would not recommend his book on
those grounds. Rather, I think the
greatest reasons for reading it are
brevity (a virtue not easily imitated in this area), a high degree of
clarity for the kind of theological
arguments he employs, and the fact
that it comes from Jewett himself,
a Professor of Systematic Theology
at Fuller Theological Seminary.
Jewett finds three main arguments
against the ordination of women.
The core of the book is a treatmentand refutation-of each in turn. The
first is the argument from the nature
of women. Under this heading he
summarizes briefly views which see
deficiencies in women ("slow of understanding," etc.) and those which
see her as a source of sexual temptation. He seems to see the latter as
the only serious version of the argument and counters with the view
that Christian men should stop
viewing women primarily as sex
objects and take a more adult approach.
The second argument is the argument from the nature of the ministerial office. Here he first mentions
modern views which state that the
impediment to ordination comes
from the meaning of women's sexuality and then concentrates on
Thomas Aquinas' views. Aquinas he
interprets as holding to a view of
the deficiency of woman in spiritual
receptivity and power, but he also
more helpfully focuses on the question of "sexual hierarchy" behind
most of these views. At thi crucial
juncture he refers us to his earlier
book MAN as Male and Female (presupposing that his earlier book
allows ome of the brevity of thi
book).
The third argument i what Jewett
call the argument from th ma culinity of God. Thi i the argument
that Jewett e ms to con id r mo t
central, becau e h trea it mo t

fully. It is in the course of responding to this argument that he deals
with most of the arguments from
scripture against the ordination of
women. He also includes an extended analysis ofthe recent Vatican
reaffirmation of the impossibility
of the ordination of women.
In this section he makes what
seems to me his core argument:
that male terms used of God are
only analogical and hence no more
revelatory of God than female ones.
He couples this with the view that
most of the scriptures' reservation
of a certain position for males is
only cultural, and he then points
out some aspects of New Testament
events that seem to him to indicate
that the New Testament goes "beyond its male constitution." Jewett
concludes with an affirmation of
women's right to the order of ministry, especially her right to seminary
training, and with a proposal for
eliminating sexist language that is
rather moderate.
This summary of the contents of
the book, however, leaves out
Jewett's underlying view of malefemale relations, a view which not
only pervades the book but at key
points conditions the arguments. He
sees Christian male-female relations in terms of modern notions of
equality that do not allow any
differentiation between individual
except on the grounds of functional
competence. Thi view h rather unhelpfully calls "a partner hip of
the exe ."
A an argument for omeon who
doe not accept Jewett'
pecific
vi w of 'partner hip of the x "
thi book i not all that trong. The
fir t two argum n again t the ordination of worn n are pr nted
rather w akly and un ympath ti ally. The r futation I found c g ntbut only for th argum n a J
tt
pr nt them. nd at hat I c nid red th k y point th r ad r
ref rr d to an arli r book.
Thew i ht f th
r,
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The author accepts many feminist principles and seems to feel little need to argue
for them, even when they are at variance with so much of previous Christian thinking.
comes in J ewett's dealing with the
argument from the masculinity of
God, and here Jewett does better.
His key argument is that male terms
about God are as analogical as female terms and hence no more
revelatory about God's nature.
Hence, one cannot argue from
scripture that God's maleness entails the maleness of the ordained
minister. While I do not think as
much of the opposition to the ordination of women is based on
viewing God as male as Jewett does,
some of it is, so his argument is
relevant.
To be sure, both male and female terms are analogical when
predicated of God. So, for that
matter, is the term "person," which
Jewett considers important in revealing the nature of God. Yet it
would be a mistake to say "person"
is no more revelatory of God than
"rock" is. Not all analogical terms
are equally fundamental or revelatory. Until he can say more, Jewett's
objection to the argument from the
masculinity of God on the basis of
the analogical nature of the words is
no more convincing than he finds
the argument itself.

How do scriptural
teachings relate to the
ordination of women?
The Ordination of Women clearly
depends on the earlier MAN as Male
and Female, and it is here that I
find the most serious deficiencies
in J ewett's approach. In the earlier
book the reader finds Jewett's
scriptural exegesis more fully presented, and can discover that his
position is based on the view that
the New Testament, Pauline writings
in particular, contains a contradiction between rabbinic views and
truly Christian ones (such as Gal.
3 :28 interpreted in a modern feminist way as "The Magna Carta of
Humanity"). The rabbinic views,
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Jewett argues, can be dismissed as
culturally conditioned. Here also
the reader discovers that J ewett's
position is based on the analysis that
all subordination involves inferiority and precludes Christian
equality. Such an analysis is based
on a conceptual unclarity, one which
makes it impo sible to do justice
to the views of the scriptures and
most of Christian tradition.
Finally, Jewett's book misses
almost completely the social-structural aspect of the ordination of
women and along with it overlooks
the significance of the socialscientific evidence for real differences between men and women. I
personally am convinced that the
roots of the objections to the ordination of women and the strongest
arguments against it come from this
area. Here I might refer the reader
to my own book, Man and Woman in
Christ (see review essay by Richard
John Neuhaus in The Cresset, March,
1981, pp. 24-31), which treats many
of the dimensions of the problem
Jewett passes by, although it does
not take a position on the ordination of women.
Jewett's book is an indication of
the times. In reading his book I
was struck once again by the new
mentality feminism has produced
among many modern Christian
thinkers. Jewett accepts uncritically many of the feminist principles
and seems to feel little need to argue
for them, even when they are at
variance with so much of previous
Christian thinking. I personally
found reading his book MAN as
Male and Female some years back
even more enlightening. Here I
found an Evangelical professor at
Fuller Seminary positing a contradiction in the teaching of scripture
and espousing the view that we
should go beyond (read: "leave behind") many of the directives in
the Bible. It was an education for
me about modern Evangelical
thought.

The ecumenical interest of this
book is surely high. It is curious to
see how many Roman Catholic
texts preoccupy a professor at
Fuller Theological Seminary. It is
entertaining to see an Evangelical
Protestant theologian finding in
the institution of mitred abbesses a
precedent for today. Surely both
Roman Catholics and Protestants
might agree that the Reformation,
in getting rid of such Medieval
developments, performed a service
to Christian people.
Finally, it is ironical to see an
Evangelical
Protestant
arguing
against a pope because the latter is
upholding th.e normativeness of
scriptural directives. One would
like to hear what Martin Luther
would say about where many of his
spiritual descendants have arrived
under the influence of modern
feminism.
Cl Stephen B. Clark

George Gissing:
Critical Essays
Edited by Jean-Pierre M ichaux. Totawa,
N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1981. Pp. 211.
Cloth, $25.

For the general reader this collection of essays would make a good
introduction to George Gissing and
hisbestnovel,New Grub Street (1891).
If, however, the book was intended for the Gissing scholar, then
it is far too brief, superficial, and
unscholarly. Many essays lack notes,
sources of information and of quotations, dates, and page numbers.
Michaux is himself culpable as editor for not supplying the missing
information.
evertheless, to one who has
done a great deal of scrounging to
read all of these selections before, it
was a pleasant experience to re-read
them in an agreeably collected
printed and bound form. Part One
"General Studie ," con i ting of
The Cresset

The reader is able at last to visualize Gissing as part of his age-even as a member
of the same philosophical and literary scene as Zola, Moore, Wells, and Bennett.
eight essays, contains some truly
basic material on Gissing- especially the very readable first-hand
accounts by Ellen Gissing (George's
sister) and Austin Harrison (his
pupil). I especially appreciate the
stories of Gissing's humor from
these two, who were so close to him
in real life. According to Ellen, for
example, George "could be ... an
uproariously mirthful [companion]
- especially when among his favourite scenes or books. This was a
side of his character practically unknown to those who knew little of
him."
As we make our way through Part
One we see appreciation for Gissing's writings growing steadily over
the decades. (Michaux would have
done the reader a service by arranging the essays in chronological order.) Robert Shafer in his 1935 piece,
"The Vitality of George Gissing,"
believes that Gissing is "a more significant and, in a real sense, more
important writer than Hardy,
though far below him as an artist."
Shafer stresses Gissing's "unpretentiousness, his cultivation and restrained independence and sanity,
his disillusioned yet not unfeeling
serenity, his sweetness, and his firm
decency" over his literary talents.
C. J. Francis's "Gissing's Characterization: Heredity and Environment" (1962), though poorly written,
is one of the most useful of all the
essays in the book. Francis gives
good examples from the novels of
Gissing's uses of contemporary ideas
about the influence of heredity, environment, and temperament upon
human character. Emile Zola's example is mentioned. The reader is
able at last to visualize Gissing as
part of his age-even as a member
of the same philosophical and literary cene as Zola and George Moore,
H. G. Wells, and Arnold Bennett.
nother important essay in the
collection is Pierre Coustillas "Gi ing Feminine Portraiture" (1963),
which gi e the background of Gi
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ing's information about women and
his opinions on feminism, and the
sources of some of Gissing's female
characters. Coustillas shows that
Gissing was very sympathetic toward the plight of women in Victorian England, but that he was not
a radical feminist: "His ideas on
woman, like his reflections on democracy and science bring him to a
dilemma: disgruntled at the mediocrity of the present, he is yet distrustful of progress. The evolution
of woman is necessary, but it
threatens those female virtues in
which he has great faith."
But Lloyd Fernando in a curious
essay entitled "Gissing's Studies in
'Vulgarism': Aspects of his AntiFeminism" (no date given) sees Gissing as a woman-hater and as always
condescending toward women. His
argument is based upon the attitudes
of male characters such as Rolfe in
The Whirlpool, who shows a distinct
bias against the independent woman
(but does Rolfe equal George Gissing?).

The essays on New Grub
Street tend to say much
the same thing and to run
together in the memory.
John Halperin's "How to Read
Gissing" is a short version of Gillian
Tindall's main theme in her 1974
study of Gissing, The Born Exile (reviewed in these pages by this ame
reviewer in 1975)-i.e., one should
read Gissing's novels as biography.
This, of course, is only partly good
advice, but it yields some fascinating theories.
The e says in Part Two, all on
ew Grub Street, are not o varied
nor so provocative a tho e in Part
One. I found John Peck' ' ew Grub
Street: An pproach Through Form"
one of the mo t inter ting b au
it examine the literary arti try of
the book. Pe k poin out th contrast Gi ing achi
b twe n th

world of activity and Reardon's
world of inactivity when he cannot
write: he admires the seeming formlessness of narration to depict the
formlessness of Reardon's days. Peck
also analyzes the symbolic structure
of the novel- the uses of the dome
of the British Museum reading
room, the streets of Loridon, rooms
where characters live, the unseen
characters behind the scenes. "This
novel is moving beyond conventional realism ... [it] is a success ...
because it turns away from the moral
realism of mid-Victorian fiction, to
explore a more frightening, more
impersonal world, which can only
be properly conveyed by a reliance
on symbols."
The general reader will enjoy
James M. Keech's essay on the threevolume novel-referred to as the
"three-headed monster" (all of Gissing's major novels were published
in this form until The Whirlpool,
1897)-and the lending libraries
such as Mudies; he or she will also
be amused by the essay by Michaux
himself on the Dickensian names in
New Grub Street (Edwin Reardon,
Jasper Milvain, Biffen, Whelpdale,
Yule, etc.). The classic pieces by
Q. D. Leavis, John Middleton Murry, and Angus Wilson are good to
have on hand. But thee ays of Part
Two- there are thirteen of themtend as a group to run together in
one's memory a all aying pr tty
much the same things: ew Grub
Street i Gis ing's ma terpiece, it captur s the ituation of th povertytricken arti t of nineteenth-c ntury
London p rfectly, it i tragic and
moving, and it u e eff ctiv ymboli m and more or 1
eff ctiv
pro (here th opinion differ).
But I do not h itat to r omted in knowin
Gi ing. I advi
th Part On
ay
r ad ew Grub treet it lf.
Cl Marilyn B. Saveson
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Remembering
Pearl Harbor
John Strietelmeier

It was, said F. D. R., a day that
would live in infamy. Cordell Hull,
the secretary of state, called in the
two Japanese cabinet ministers who
were on a diplomatic mission to the
United States, and cussed them out
in the Tennessee vernacular of
which he was an acknowledged
master. Winston Churchill heaved
a great sigh of relief and, for the
first time, felt privately the confidence in ultimate victory which he
had so often and so eloquently expressed publicly.
The "Yellow Peril" had finally
struck the treacherous blow that
many had been expecting for at
least four decades, since Teddy
Roosevelt's day. We had been
warned that under a thin layer of
modernization the Asian heart and
mind of Japan still brimmed with
hostility and deceit which would
sooner or later overflow in aggression against the white man. And so,
it seemed, it had happened. Pearl
Harbor was aflame. The greater
part of the American Pacific fleet
had been destroyed or badly damaged. There were reports that a
Japanese fifth column within the
United States was sabotaging strategic sites and supplies on the
West Coast.
Like almost everyone who was
32

alive on December 7, 1941, I have
vivid memories of where I was and
with whom, · and what we talked
about. I discovered as far back as
February, 1946, that nobody who was
not in the service wants to be bored
by the reminiscences of those of us
who were. Sq I shall not bore you
with the details. Suffice it to say
that by the end of that day I knew
that I could not with a good conscience proceed with plans for seminary and the ministry. As a matter
of fact, I could not even be sure that
I would be allowed to finish college.
Of the twenty-four men in our
fraternity house that day, probably
eighteen eventually ended up in one
or another branch of the service.
Two of them died on active duty.
Looking back on Pearl Harbor Day
itself and the six months between
it and the following Commencement, I have no recollection of the
kinds of reaction one might expect
under the circumstances-no bitterness, no self-pity, only a little
braggadocio, only occasional testiness. But graduation day came as a
relief. Many of us had been mentally
in uniform since December. Now, at
last, we could get about the task for
which we were dressed.
I have often tried to explain to my
own satisfaction why we went as
quietly and as willingly as we did.
The 1930s and the early 1940s were
not a heyday of patriotism, and I
suspect that most of us who were in
high school or college in those days
prided ourselves on being unsentimental about our country. As I have
already indicated, the great majority of us, while disapproving of
Japanese "treachery," saw it as
nothing more than was to be expected from Asiatics; we did not
particularly hate them for being
what they were. We certainly harbored no illusions about being embarked upon some adventurous
Crusade against infidel or Hun·
indeed we laughed at the lurid

products of feverish copy-writers
who felt the call to whip the nation
up into a lather of self-righteous
blood-lust.
We went, like Willie and Joe and
the Sad Sack, because it came down
to a matter of We or They in a context of total victory or total defeat.
World War II was not a police action. It was all-out war. And however it may have begun in 1939, by
1941 it was a struggle not for glory
or for territory or for empire, but
sheerly and desperate! y for survival - at least from the point of
view of the Atlantic powers. In ·
circumstances like that, the civics
books that you read in high school
become irrelevant. You revert to
the logic of the tribe, a logic of We
and They. It never occurred to us
to question which side we were on
or what obligations arose from our
choice of sides.
So we went, not in defense of
such abstractions as The Constitution or The American Way of Life
or American Womanhood or Religious Freedom but to do whatever
needed to be done to keep Them
from mucking about with our
families and our friends, our wives
and our children, our schools and
our churches, the towns where we
grew up and the places where we
worked- all very local and very
particular things. Eventually we
came to know about the outrages of
Belsen and Auschwitz and that
made us feel even better about
being involved on Our side of the
war. But we didn't get into the war
in the first instance to avenge the
innocent Jews. We got in because
They had threatened our Tribe.
And that, in my judgment at least,
is reason enough to go to war.
And that also, perhaps, suggests
that our best and mo t realistic
hope for avoiding wars is to enlarge
our concept of the Tribe until it
eventually embraces the whole
human race.
ti
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